Larry Diamond
Larry Diamond is the William L. Clayton Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution and Mosbacher Senior Fellow in Global Democracy at Stanford’s Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies. He is a Stanford professor by courtesy of political science and sociology whose public work focuses on democracy, authoritarianism, U.S. foreign policy, China, Taiwan, and global democratic governance.
China’s Communists Won Through Foreign Backing and Attritional War
At a Hoover Institution book talk, historian Frank Dikötter argued that the Chinese Communist Party’s victory in 1949 was neither inevitable nor chiefly the result of mass peasant support. Drawing on archival research behind Red Dawn Over China, Dikötter presented the conquest as a contingent outcome shaped by Soviet sponsorship, Japan’s destruction of the Chinese Republic’s position, American pressure for truce and coalition in 1946, and the party’s use of coercion, forced conscription and attritional warfare.
Exiled Russian Opposition Can Still Pierce Putin’s Information Monopoly
At a Hoover Institution screening of Lyuba’s Hope, Russian opposition figure Lyubov Sobol argued that exile has constrained but not ended her political work against Vladimir Putin’s regime. In discussion with filmmaker Marianna Yarovskaya, producer Paul Gregory, Kathryn Stoner, and Larry Diamond, Sobol described a strategy built around reaching Russian audiences through blocked platforms, documenting repression and war support, pushing sanctions and visa cases abroad, and preparing for a democratic opening organized around institutions rather than revenge.
Taiwanese Support for Self-Defense Is High but Conditional
Wen-Chin Wu, in a Hoover Institution talk drawing on multiple public-opinion surveys, argues that Taiwanese support for self-defense is high but conditional. He separates backing for national defense measures, including U.S. arms purchases, from personal willingness to fight or resist, and finds that both depend heavily on perceived threat from China, expectations of U.S. intervention, party identity, costs, and question wording. The result, in Wu’s account, is not a Taiwan that is either complacent or uniformly resolved, but a public that is “worried but cool” amid coercion and strategic ambiguity.
China Could Pressure Taiwan Into Submission Without Invading
In Defending Taiwan, Eyck Freymann argues that U.S. strategy is too narrowly focused on deterring a Chinese invasion and is underprepared for a gray-zone crisis that could isolate Taiwan without open war. Freymann’s case, developed in discussion with Hoover Institution participants including Philip Zelikow, is that Beijing’s most plausible path may be legal, commercial, and coercive control over Taiwan’s external ties. Deterrence, he argues, will require Washington and its allies to integrate military power with political discipline, economic planning, technological leverage, and diplomatic coordination before such a crisis begins.