James Ellis
Retired four-star U.S. Navy admiral and Annenberg Distinguished Visiting Fellow at the Hoover Institution, where he oversees the Global Policy and Strategy Initiative and the George P. Shultz Energy Policy Working Group. He previously commanded U.S. Strategic Command and served as president and CEO of the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations.
Southeast Asia Accepts Maritime Capacity Building, Not Quad Alignment
Southeast Asian states are open to maritime-security cooperation with Australia, India, Japan and the United States, but resist arrangements that make them appear to join a bloc against China, according to a Hoover Institution discussion featuring regional experts. Le Hiep, Sarah Teo and Muhammad Kharisma argue that Vietnam, Singapore and Indonesia assess proposals by their leadership, purpose, location and degree of national control: capacity-building, information-sharing and disaster relief can be acceptable, while visible warfighting integration and Quad branding raise the political cost.
Hormuz Closure Exposes Energy Security’s Dependence on Naval Power
Admiral James O. Ellis argues that Iran’s prolonged closure of the Strait of Hormuz has exposed an energy transition driven less by fuels than by vulnerability: access now depends on geography, military protection and commercial confidence. Replacement oil and gas can ease an immediate shock, he says, but cannot reopen a route that shipowners and crews consider unsafe. Ellis calls for greater naval capacity, allied cooperation and advance planning with Asian partners whose energy supplies depend heavily on Gulf transit.
America’s Energy Advantage Can Strengthen Allies Before the Window Closes
James Ellis argues that U.S. energy abundance has become a strategic asset at a dangerous moment, not merely a domestic question of supply, prices, or technology. Speaking through the Hoover Institution’s George P. Shultz Energy Policy Working Group, he makes the case for American energy statecraft: using oil and gas production, nuclear and geothermal development, capital, technology, and allied partnerships to strengthen national security, support vulnerable partners, and counter adversaries. That opportunity, he warns, is rare and may be closing.
Taiwanese Support for Self-Defense Is High but Conditional
Wen-Chin Wu, in a Hoover Institution talk drawing on multiple public-opinion surveys, argues that Taiwanese support for self-defense is high but conditional. He separates backing for national defense measures, including U.S. arms purchases, from personal willingness to fight or resist, and finds that both depend heavily on perceived threat from China, expectations of U.S. intervention, party identity, costs, and question wording. The result, in Wu’s account, is not a Taiwan that is either complacent or uniformly resolved, but a public that is “worried but cool” amid coercion and strategic ambiguity.
China Could Pressure Taiwan Into Submission Without Invading
In Defending Taiwan, Eyck Freymann argues that U.S. strategy is too narrowly focused on deterring a Chinese invasion and is underprepared for a gray-zone crisis that could isolate Taiwan without open war. Freymann’s case, developed in discussion with Hoover Institution participants including Philip Zelikow, is that Beijing’s most plausible path may be legal, commercial, and coercive control over Taiwan’s external ties. Deterrence, he argues, will require Washington and its allies to integrate military power with political discipline, economic planning, technological leverage, and diplomatic coordination before such a crisis begins.