James Ellis
Retired U.S. Navy four-star admiral and former commander of U.S. Strategic Command; Annenberg Distinguished Visiting Fellow at the Hoover Institution focused on energy policy, national security, Indo-Pacific security, semiconductors, and international defense affairs.
America’s Energy Advantage Can Strengthen Allies Before the Window Closes
James Ellis argues that U.S. energy abundance has become a strategic asset at a dangerous moment, not merely a domestic question of supply, prices, or technology. Speaking through the Hoover Institution’s George P. Shultz Energy Policy Working Group, he makes the case for American energy statecraft: using oil and gas production, nuclear and geothermal development, capital, technology, and allied partnerships to strengthen national security, support vulnerable partners, and counter adversaries. That opportunity, he warns, is rare and may be closing.
Taiwanese Support for Self-Defense Is High but Conditional
Wen-Chin Wu, in a Hoover Institution talk drawing on multiple public-opinion surveys, argues that Taiwanese support for self-defense is high but conditional. He separates backing for national defense measures, including U.S. arms purchases, from personal willingness to fight or resist, and finds that both depend heavily on perceived threat from China, expectations of U.S. intervention, party identity, costs, and question wording. The result, in Wu’s account, is not a Taiwan that is either complacent or uniformly resolved, but a public that is “worried but cool” amid coercion and strategic ambiguity.
China Could Pressure Taiwan Into Submission Without Invading
In Defending Taiwan, Eyck Freymann argues that U.S. strategy is too narrowly focused on deterring a Chinese invasion and is underprepared for a gray-zone crisis that could isolate Taiwan without open war. Freymann’s case, developed in discussion with Hoover Institution participants including Philip Zelikow, is that Beijing’s most plausible path may be legal, commercial, and coercive control over Taiwan’s external ties. Deterrence, he argues, will require Washington and its allies to integrate military power with political discipline, economic planning, technological leverage, and diplomatic coordination before such a crisis begins.