America’s Energy Advantage Can Strengthen Allies Before the Window Closes
James Ellis argues that U.S. energy abundance has become a strategic asset at a dangerous moment, not merely a domestic question of supply, prices, or technology. Speaking through the Hoover Institution’s George P. Shultz Energy Policy Working Group, he makes the case for American energy statecraft: using oil and gas production, nuclear and geothermal development, capital, technology, and allied partnerships to strengthen national security, support vulnerable partners, and counter adversaries. That opportunity, he warns, is rare and may be closing.
America’s energy window is rare, strategic, and closing
James Ellis frames American energy abundance as a strategic opening that will not remain open indefinitely. In what he calls “arguably the most dangerous era since the Cuban Missile Crisis,” U.S. energy policy is no longer only a domestic question about supply, prices, or technology. It is tied directly to whether the United States can use its resource position as statecraft in a more dangerous geopolitical environment.
The security premise is direct. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, China’s intimidation of Taiwan under Xi Jinping, and continuing conflict in the Middle East have shown, in Ellis’s words, that “the world is a more dangerous place than many like to admit.” In that environment, economics, technology, and security no longer sit in separate policy lanes. They intersect “in new and sometimes ambiguous ways,” making energy security a matter of national security.
For the United States, that shift turns a long-standing vulnerability into an opportunity. After decades of treating the energy landscape primarily as a source of risk, the country now has the possibility of using energy abundance as a strategic asset. In 2023, Ellis says, the United States was the world’s largest producer of oil and natural gas, the third-largest oil exporter, and the largest gas exporter.
The United States also leads, according to Ellis, in the discovery of new energy technologies and in raising capital for new energy investments. The resulting claim is that America is now a “global energy superpower,” and that domestic energy choices will directly affect the vitality of allies and partners abroad.
The policy mix he describes is deliberately broad: domestic oil and gas production, advances in clean and reliable energy such as nuclear and geothermal, capital formation, technology development, and partnerships with allies and like-minded nations.
The Shultz framework treats energy as an economic, environmental, and security problem
The institutional frame is the Hoover Institution’s George P. Shultz Energy Policy Working Group, founded by Shultz in 2007. Its governing idea is what Shultz called a “balanced approach” to the economic, environmental, and security dimensions of energy policy.
A Hoover webpage shown on screen describes the working group as pursuing that same balance and says that, in an emerging geopolitical era “arguably the most dangerous since 1962,” the group aims to shape an agenda for assessing how energy choices can strengthen “America and the West.”
The group’s work is presented as more than abstract policy research. At the annual Global Energy Statecraft Workshop, energy and national security experts convene with industry practitioners to examine how U.S. energy resources, technologies, know-how, and markets can deepen American national security and strengthen partnerships with like-minded countries.
Energy resources and energy capabilities are treated as instruments of statecraft: tools that can support allies, reduce vulnerabilities, and shape policy in a more contested world.
China’s push for self-sufficiency reflects strategic insecurity
James Ellis contrasts the American position with China’s. Although China remains heavily reliant on imported energy, its ambitions have pushed energy policy toward full self-sufficiency and independence, a goal China hopes to achieve by 2060.
The warning is aimed partly at American policymakers and observers who prioritize climate factors in national energy strategy. They may not appreciate, Ellis says, how much China’s domestic energy investments are shaped by a “pervasive sense of energy insecurity.” China’s energy choices, in this framing, cannot be understood only through emissions policy or industrial development. They also reflect concern about dependence and exposure.
The visuals accompanying the China discussion underline the military and industrial context: footage of a Chinese military officer, fighter jets flying in formation, and industrial infrastructure, followed by cooling towers and coal-moving equipment. The point is not that China’s energy strategy is separate from great-power competition, but that it is embedded in it.
Allied energy weakness makes U.S. choices consequential abroad
James Ellis places Europe and the Indo-Pacific at the center of the allied-energy-security problem. Europe remains “incredibly vulnerable” to Russia’s ability to threaten terminals, pipelines, and electrical grids. The problem is not only access to fuel; it is the exposure of the systems that move and deliver energy.
In the Indo-Pacific, some of America’s closest allies face poor energy security. Japan is the central example. It was forced to shutter 33 nuclear power plants; although some are being restarted, Japan still relies heavily on liquefied natural gas imports. South Korea and Taiwan are similarly dependent on LNG imports at a moment when energy security has “never been more important.”
| Region or ally | Energy-security concern Ellis identifies |
|---|---|
| Europe | Exposure to Russian threats against terminals, pipelines, and electrical grids |
| Japan | Shutdown of 33 nuclear plants and continued heavy reliance on LNG imports |
| South Korea | Dependence on LNG imports |
| Taiwan | Dependence on LNG imports |
The source pairs these claims with images of energy infrastructure: storage tanks, a coastal nuclear facility, industrial equipment, and transmission towers. The vulnerabilities Ellis identifies are therefore not abstract. They involve the physical systems that keep allied economies and militaries supplied.
American abundance has an external function in this argument. U.S. resources, markets, technologies, and know-how can be used to deepen partnerships and bolster security for like-minded nations. That is why Ellis links domestic energy choices to the vitality of allies and partners abroad.
Domestic demand and infrastructure timelines make delay costly
James Ellis does not present the answer as simply exporting more. U.S. energy demand is rising at home “with no signs of slowing down.” Electricity demand from AI data centers, growth in manufacturing and industrial reshoring, and broader nationwide electrification together require what he calls a systematic approach that can meet domestic demand while also providing energy security abroad.
That approach includes domestic oil and gas production and advances in “clean and reliable energy” such as nuclear and geothermal. The point is broader than a single-fuel strategy. Energy abundance depends both on existing resource strength and on technological progress.
American energy abundance offers a moment for US political leaders to think about how to best take advantage of our new position. But that window is closing in a more dangerous global geopolitical environment.
Infrastructure makes the political problem harder. Energy projects require large amounts of capital and have long lifetimes. For that reason, Ellis says, the chosen course must be able to “transcend politics and administrations.” The visuals pair this claim with footage of President Joe Biden and former President Donald Trump, reinforcing the argument that energy strategy cannot be remade cleanly every four years if it is meant to support national security and allied resilience.
The proposed advantage rests on markets, technology, and partnerships
James Ellis locates American energy strength in the country’s institutions and economic model. U.S. rule of law, private enterprise, human ingenuity, resource endowments, and “true grit,” he says, have produced more American soft power on energy than at any time in the country’s history.
Technology is central to that advantage. “Technology is our strength,” Ellis says, and it comes from a free-market economy and a democratic system. The policy prescription that follows is to embrace that strength with confidence, form mutually beneficial partnerships with friends abroad, and continue giving entrepreneurs the ability to compete while unleashing American resources.
Energy statecraft, in this account, is not a narrow export program or a technocratic planning exercise. It is the use of American resources, innovation, capital, and partnerships to build a more secure and resilient position for the United States, its allies, and what Ellis calls “the free world.”