Torsten Slok
Partner and Chief Economist at Apollo, where he publishes macroeconomic and market analysis through Apollo’s research and media channels. He previously worked at Deutsche Bank, the OECD, and the IMF, and is a frequent media commentator on economics, markets, inflation, and monetary policy.
Central Bank Independence Requires Limits on Tools, Not Just Mandates
At a Hoover Institution conference on central-bank independence, Thomas Drechsel, Luis Garicano and Carolyn Wilkins argued over how far legal insulation can stretch once central banks have large balance sheets, emergency tools and broad theories of monetary transmission. Drechsel used Fed chairs’ calendars to show how the job has become more outward-facing; Garicano warned that the ECB’s narrow mandate has not prevented fiscal, financial and climate-related expansion through its tools; and Wilkins argued that independence can survive only with clearer boundaries, cost-benefit discipline, exit rules and external review.
Reserve Bank Removal Powers Could Expose the Fed to Presidential Control
At a Hoover Institution conference on central-bank governance, John Cochrane, Edward Nelson, Gary Richardson and David Wilcox treated Federal Reserve independence as a delegated legal structure rather than a self-executing norm. Richardson argued that Congress designed the Fed to frustrate presidential control, while Wilcox warned that ambiguous authority over Reserve Bank presidents could still give a determined president a path into the FOMC. Nelson added that independence protects the Fed’s operational judgment, not the quality of its monetary doctrine.