Austan Goolsbee
Austan Goolsbee is the president and CEO of the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago and an economist focused on monetary policy, productivity growth, and the economic implications of technologies including AI. He previously served as chair of the White House Council of Economic Advisers and as a professor at the University of Chicago Booth School of Business.
The Fed Should Respond When Supply Shocks Keep Inflation Elevated
Chicago Fed President Austan Goolsbee argues that the Federal Reserve should not automatically look through negative supply shocks when they are likely to keep inflation above target. Unlike demand-driven overheating, a supply shock leaves the Fed to restrain demand against reduced productive capacity, risking larger losses in employment and output. In a conversation with Steven Davis, Goolsbee makes the case for responding to persistent supply-driven inflation, but not with the same force as to excess demand.
Fed Officials Call for Better Classification Tools Under Economic Uncertainty
At a Hoover Institution policy panel on central-bank independence, structure and emerging risks, Federal Reserve officials Michelle Bowman, Mary Daly, Austan Goolsbee and Christopher Waller each argued that the Fed’s next problems turn on classifying risks before they are obvious in hindsight. Bowman focused on capital rules and private credit, Daly on distinguishing temporary from persistent inflation shocks, Goolsbee on whether expected AI productivity gains lower or raise the appropriate rate path, and Waller on which Fed functions require regional autonomy rather than centralized operations.
Reserve Bank Removal Powers Could Expose the Fed to Presidential Control
At a Hoover Institution conference on central-bank governance, John Cochrane, Edward Nelson, Gary Richardson and David Wilcox treated Federal Reserve independence as a delegated legal structure rather than a self-executing norm. Richardson argued that Congress designed the Fed to frustrate presidential control, while Wilcox warned that ambiguous authority over Reserve Bank presidents could still give a determined president a path into the FOMC. Nelson added that independence protects the Fed’s operational judgment, not the quality of its monetary doctrine.