Tariffs on Imported Inputs Spread Costs Through Global Supply Chains
Stephen Redding argues that the US turn toward tariffs is a reversal of the postwar push to reduce trade barriers—and that the costs can extend well beyond imported goods. The first Trump-administration tariff rounds show how taxes on components can raise costs for domestic manufacturers while retaliatory measures restrict US exporters. Redding contrasts those relatively defined rounds with the more volatile 2025–26 escalation, and places both in a longer history in which trade openness has risen and fallen with policy.

Tariffs reach beyond the imported good when production crosses borders
A tariff is a tax on imported goods, but its effects do not stop at the border. When a domestic firm uses imported materials or components, a tariff can raise the cost of producing at home. When trading partners retaliate, US exporters can face barriers abroad as well. Stephen Redding uses the first Trump-administration tariff rounds to show why the effects of a tariff depend not only on its rate, but also on what it covers and how production is organized.
The 2018–19 tariffs were initially concentrated on imported intermediate inputs and capital goods, including steel and parts and components used by domestic firms. Consumer goods became targets later. Redding says this ordering was unusual: governments have often focused tariffs on consumer goods because taxing imported inputs raises costs for domestic businesses.
A slide breaking the tariff rounds down by end use separates agriculture, intermediate inputs, capital goods, and consumer goods. Its bars show the import value affected in each wave; Redding’s point is that inputs and capital goods were significant early targets. For a firm relying on an imported component, the tariff becomes part of the cost of obtaining what it needs to make its own product.
That channel matters more in a production system where goods and components cross borders at multiple stages. Redding contrasts late nineteenth-century trade, which often involved finished goods exchanged across countries, with the later rise of global value chains, in which countries divide stages of production among them. In the earlier model he describes, Ford’s River Rouge plant in Detroit brought raw materials in one side and sent finished cars out the other, with many stages of production carried out at the same site. In the later model, production can be spread across national borders.
Redding’s example is the iPhone: designed in California, assembled in China and, more recently, India, with components coming from many countries. A tariff on one of those components can affect the costs of a firm that uses it, even if the final product is assembled elsewhere. In that setting, tariffs on inputs can pass through production networks rather than falling only on buyers of imported finished goods.
The tariff rounds also exposed US exporters to retaliation. Redding describes foreign retaliation as substantial and says trading partners filed complaints at the World Trade Organization. A chart tracks the cumulative value of US exports subject to retaliatory tariffs over time. The total can fall when a country removes a tariff, but the broad pattern Redding emphasizes is that foreign governments responded to US measures with tariffs of their own.
Taken together, the input and retaliation channels show why the exposure is wider than the tariffed import itself. A domestic firm may pay more for imported inputs, while an exporter may encounter new barriers in a foreign market. Redding’s account of the first Trump-administration rounds focuses on how tariffs entered both production costs and trade between countries.
Trade openness rose and fell with policy, not on a one-way path
Redding places the recent turn toward tariffs against a longer history of changing trade barriers. A chart of US customs-duty revenue as a share of goods imports shows high tariffs in the early decades of the republic, a decline through the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, a sharp rise in the interwar period, and a long postwar decline. On this measure, US tariffs were below 3 percent of import value in 2016.
The measure is the customs duty collected on imports divided by the total value of imports. Redding says early tariffs were often defended as a way to protect domestic manufacturing while the United States was emerging as a manufacturing power. The interwar rise included the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act. After the Second World War, tariffs fell through multilateral negotiations and regional trade agreements.
Redding describes the postwar United States as a leading proponent of a rules-based international order. In trade, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, established in 1948 and later succeeded by the World Trade Organization, provided a forum for negotiating reductions in trade barriers. Two principles shaped those negotiations. Non-discrimination, often called most-favored-nation treatment, meant that a lower tariff offered to one member generally had to be offered to other members. Reciprocity meant that a tariff reduction was expected to be met by a comparable concession, though not necessarily on the same product. A country might reduce tariffs on imported SUVs while a trading partner reduced tariffs on motorbikes, provided the trade involved was comparable in value.
Regional agreements offered another route to lower barriers. Redding points to the Canada-US Free Trade Agreement in 1988, NAFTA in 1994, and the US-Mexico-Canada Agreement in 2020. These agreements allowed members to eliminate tariffs among themselves while retaining tariffs on non-members—an exception to the general non-discrimination rule permitted within the multilateral system.
A second chart tracks total trade as a share of GDP across several economies from 1890 to 2008. It shows trade openness rising in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, falling in the interwar years, and rising again in the late twentieth century. The United States sits below smaller economies such as the United Kingdom. Redding attributes that difference to country size: a larger share of economic transactions in a large country takes place within its own borders and therefore does not count as international trade.
The paired histories of tariffs and trade openness make a central point in Redding’s account: globalization can reverse. The interwar drop in trade coincided with rising tariffs, while the later rise in trade accompanied reductions in barriers. Redding describes the late nineteenth-century period as a first era of globalization, aided by railroads and steamships. The later era brought a different form of integration: production stages were increasingly divided across countries. That change helps explain why tariffs on inputs can reach firms far from the border where the tax is collected.
The 2018–19 rounds are the clearer case; the later escalation is more volatile
The United States began reversing its postwar direction with successive tariff rounds in 2018 and 2019. Redding treats these measures as a more tractable case for studying tariff effects than the later changes. They arrived in six main waves during 2018 and two during 2019, and the average import-weighted tariff rate rose from below 3 percent as additional products became subject to tariffs.
The sequence matters for the comparison. Redding says the first-administration tariffs were introduced in relatively well-defined rounds, with less volatility and uncertainty over their levels. He describes them as a natural experiment: the 2016 presidential election was difficult to forecast, and the subsequent tariff increases were not certain in advance. That makes the rounds a useful setting for tracing what changed as tariffs were applied to more products.
The later escalation involved a different policy environment. Redding says the April 2, 2025 announcement imposed a universal 10 percent tariff on imported goods, alongside additional tariffs on individual trading partners, under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act. As the United States and China escalated their measures, he says, US tariffs on Chinese exports reached about 147 percent, with Chinese tariffs on US exports at roughly the same magnitude. Following negotiations, the tariffs were postponed and brought down from those peaks.
Redding says the Supreme Court ruled in February 2026 that IEEPA did not grant the executive branch authority to impose tariffs, a power reserved for Congress. He says the administration replaced those measures with a tariff under Section 122 of the Trade Act of 1974, initially 10 percent and later 15 percent. He describes Section 122 as allowing tariffs for 150 days in response to a balance-of-payments emergency, framed in this case as a large current-account deficit. After that period, he says, the United States introduced tariffs of 10 or 12.5 percent under Section 301 of the same act, citing trading partners’ failure to enforce restrictions on forced labor.
Redding also notes that negotiations, exemptions, imperfect enforcement, and USMCA compliance complicate the picture of the later tariff changes. The first-administration rounds provide a more defined sequence; the 2025–26 escalation involved changing rates and legal bases as well as negotiations. The distinction is why he uses the earlier rounds to examine how tariffs transmit through prices, production, and trade.
