China’s Arctic Military Presence Is Limited, but Its Capabilities Are Growing

China is not yet a major independent military actor in the Arctic. Glenn Tiffert said that, in the public record, China has operated militarily in the region twice, jointly with Russia on the Pacific side in 2024. It has not operated independently there, and it has not conducted comparable operations on the Atlantic side. Russia remains the principal military threat.

Tiffert’s concern is what China may be able to do after building access and capability. Its research vessels, ice-capable ships, scientific facilities and commercial activity can develop knowledge and experience relevant to future operations. The current military picture is limited; the concern is that China is investing in options it could use later.

The region’s changing conditions add economic and strategic stakes. As sea ice melts, new transit routes may connect Asia and Europe, and ships from countries without a traditional Arctic presence can reach waters that were once harder to enter. The United States has long viewed the Arctic through the lens of Russian missile trajectories, submarine activity and the defense of NATO allies. Access to oil and critical minerals also matters, though extraction is expensive and not currently economically viable in many cases. Control of access could matter for future exploitation.

China is not alone among emerging powers interested in the region. India, South Korea and Japan are also showing greater interest. What distinguishes China, Tiffert said, is its capacity to project power and its ambition to influence how the Arctic is governed. Russia, he emphasized, is “far and away the pacing threat”; China is beginning to appear and build capability.

China’s Arctic activity began with a state-sponsored research expedition in 1999. Glenn Tiffert recounted that the expedition had obtained permits from Canadian authorities, but a miscommunication in Ottawa left some officials surprised when a Chinese vessel appeared moored about 25 miles off Canada’s northern frontier. The episode sharpened Canadian questions about its ability to monitor activity along that frontier.

China has since conducted 16 research expeditions, according to Tiffert, with increasing sophistication and a growing fleet of icebreakers and ice-capable research vessels. It has also established two land-based research facilities, one in Iceland and one in Norway. Its current activities include scientific research and exploring shipping routes. Tiffert said the vessels and research methods can produce information useful for military purposes, but did not describe them as evidence of a substantial Chinese military presence.

Research buoys, for example, can support legitimate scientific work while also collecting data relevant to submarine operations. Bathymetric surveys map the seafloor; that knowledge can help locate undersea cables and pipelines. Studies of salinity and Arctic diatoms can also inform understanding of conditions that affect submarine communications. Tiffert said it is difficult to draw a clean line between basic science and research with military applications in the Arctic.

He noted that China is exercising the same rights to conduct research and transit through international waters that the United States uses off China’s coast. The issue, in his account, is not that such research is inherently illegitimate, but that its resulting data and experience may have security value.

The facilities in Iceland and Norway raise similar questions. Tiffert said research on magnetic fields and other scientific subjects can also help assess technologies such as over-the-horizon radar under challenging conditions. The facilities are being watched closely, but he did not describe them as a substitute for a military presence.

Cooperation with Russia is another part of the picture, though it has limits. Joint Chinese-Russian operations have taken place on the North Pacific side rather than near Russia’s North Atlantic military assets. Tiffert said Russia is protective of its ballistic-missile submarine force, based near Murmansk and in the Barents Sea, and does not invite Chinese military vessels to operate near it.

The Arctic Council consists of the eight states with territory at or above the Arctic Circle: Canada, Denmark, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, Finland, the United States and Russia. Seven are NATO members. Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, its participation has been more limited, and the other states are often referred to as the “Arctic Seven.”

China is not a member, but it holds observer status and can participate in some activities and discussions. Glenn Tiffert said China has contributed to research, including work on migratory birds and climate change. Its observer role does not give it decision-making authority. The Arctic states maintain that governance of the region should remain principally with countries that have territory there.

China has called itself a “near-Arctic power,” a label that the Arctic Council members have not accepted as a basis for a greater formal role. Tiffert argued that Beijing is seeking to widen the circle of influence by describing the Arctic as a global commons. That framing links to China’s broader effort to reshape international governance in ways that increase its influence relative to established powers.

The dispute concerns not only who participates in the Council, but how the region’s waters are classified. Tiffert said China is working to advance the position that Arctic waterways should be treated as international waters. Some Arctic states instead regard certain passages as straits under their jurisdiction. The distinction has practical consequences: if waters are international, ships can transit without the neighboring state’s consent.

China is not the only country that might support a broader role for non-Arctic states. Tiffert named India, South Korea and Japan as countries with interests in the region, though none is pushing as hard as China, and their interests do not align with Beijing on every issue. He also noted that Arctic states can work with Japan and South Korea through other forums; widening the Arctic Council’s role is not the only way to discuss regional issues.

During the 1990s and 2000s, China pursued partnerships and investment opportunities in Arctic countries. At the time, many governments saw China as distant and not an immediate security concern, and welcomed investment, Glenn Tiffert said. That outlook changed as officials became more alert to the strategic implications of land purchases, mining rights and investment in sensitive sectors.

The response developed country by country. In the early 2020s, Nordic governments and Iceland adopted or expanded investment-screening mechanisms, in some cases modeled on the US CFIUS process. Tiffert noted that these mechanisms can be country-agnostic in form while still limiting Chinese investment in practice. They can screen new investments in sensitive areas and address investments already in place. He described the resulting coordination among the United States and regional allies as a bright spot in managing China-related risks.

The war in Ukraine sharpened those concerns, but some screening efforts began earlier. Tiffert said the restrictions have largely blocked Chinese access to critical minerals across much of the region. Earlier Chinese approaches to resource development have mostly been curtailed, leaving less strategically important activity, such as gold and ordinary minerals. The climate, distance and cost of Arctic extraction also make major commercial projects difficult.

China’s public messaging has shifted too. Tiffert said the 13th and 14th five-year plans explicitly signaled the Arctic’s strategic importance and described ambitions to build icebreakers and research vessels. The draft of the 15th five-year plan, by contrast, does not explicitly mention the Arctic, though it refers more obliquely to polar research and infrastructure. The designation of the Arctic as a strategic domain was also removed from the plan, despite appearing in earlier recommendations.

That change could indicate a tactical adjustment after Beijing’s assertive approach prompted resistance, Tiffert said; some Chinese-language commentary has suggested as much. Elizabeth Economy cautioned that a change in language does not necessarily mean a change in policy, distinguishing what China announces from what it continues to do. Tiffert said the capabilities remain under development even as the rhetoric has cooled.

He described China’s approach as “forking”: after encountering resistance in the Western Arctic states, it has shifted toward developing Arctic capabilities in partnership with Russia. Chinese investment in Russian oil and gas projects became more important as Western investment receded. But that route carries its own constraints. Tiffert said a recently adopted US law targeting Russian and Iranian energy exports could expose Chinese minority investors and service firms involved in those projects to sanctions. How the US government will use those authorities remains unclear.

Russia needs Chinese capital and a market for its oil and gas, Tiffert said, but China is in the stronger bargaining position. It can press for favorable prices and remain noncommittal on projects such as the Power of Siberia 2 pipeline. The partnership therefore offers China access, but not on terms that necessarily serve Russia equally.

As ice melts, China is exploring a shipping route through the Russian Arctic to connect China more directly with Europe. Glenn Tiffert framed it as an additional route alongside existing options, including passage through the Indian Ocean and Malacca Strait and a corridor through Central Asia and Georgia. The Arctic route could reduce reliance on passages where China worries the US Navy might be able to interdict shipping.

For now, the route is not economically viable for much of the year. Tiffert cited high costs, limited seasonal access and a lack of insurance as obstacles. China is nevertheless carrying out what he called a proof of concept. Elizabeth Economy said China has already undertaken trial transits and is considering more regular service, at least during part of the year. Those trials do not establish that the route is commercially viable or that regular service is in place. Early participation could position Chinese firms in a market that may grow as ice conditions change, though Tiffert described the effort as a long game rather than a viable alternative today.

Glenn Tiffert argued that the United States should strengthen Arctic early-warning and interception capabilities, largely because of Russia’s stepped-up activity. Russian bomber missions have increased, he said, and Chinese bombers have joined some. Russia remains the main military concern, particularly around Alaska. Maintaining US capabilities there in partnership with Canada is therefore important.

Canada is also building its ability to monitor northern waters. Tiffert pointed to its announced intention to acquire a dozen submarines and to reports of unmarked ships appearing in places such as Hudson Bay, where Indigenous communities in Nunavut have wanted to know who was operating nearby. As new routes open, identifying vessels and maintaining domain awareness become more important.

Scientific research is another area where Tiffert urged the United States to act. If researchers from other countries need a vessel to conduct climate or fisheries work, China may be able to offer one. Tiffert said the United States should provide a competitive alternative rather than leave a gap that Chinese research ships can fill. He warned that weakening US research capacity and funding could put the country on the back foot.

The agreement involving Greenland, Denmark and the United States had just been signed when the discussion took place. Economy asked whether its provision for the United States to establish two military bases would add significant capability. Tiffert said the bases would restore capability the United States once had and later lost when the Soviet Union collapsed and the Russian threat receded. They would also signal that the United States takes the region seriously. Their value, in his account, would be both operational and symbolic.

But Tiffert emphasized that capability alone is not enough. The United States has common interests with Arctic allies in sovereignty, monitoring activity and controlling access to sensitive resources. Cooperation on investment screening and security has developed through shared risk assessments, especially after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and China’s support for Russia made the links between theaters harder to ignore.

That cooperation has been strained by US threats toward Greenland. Tiffert said people in the region were outraged by recent US behavior and that rebuilding goodwill would take time. He hoped the agreement would remove a source of tension and help begin that process. He described it as a hoped-for first step, not as evidence that trust had already been restored. The broader point was that Arctic coordination rests not only on common interests, but also on trust among the states pursuing them.

Looking at China’s position since 2012–13, Glenn Tiffert said Beijing had “overplayed its hand.” Its early ambition helped provoke stronger resistance from Arctic states, and the war in Ukraine amplified that resistance. China has lost room to pursue some of the investments it once sought in the Western Arctic, but it is adapting through cooperation with Russia and continued investment in ships and other capabilities.

China’s partnership with Russia gives it a path forward, but Tiffert said Beijing sees itself as the superior partner and is setting terms according to its own interests. The relationship does not erase the limits on China’s access elsewhere, nor does it guarantee Russia the support it wants. Meanwhile, China continues to invest in ice-capable ships and other assets that could give it options at an indeterminate point in the future.