National-Security Tariffs Make Sense Only for Specific Supply Risks
Hoover Institution economist Stephen Redding argues that tariffs can sometimes serve national security or other strategic goals, but those cases are narrow and depend on the industry and the risk involved. The case for supporting domestic semiconductor production, for example, is different from imposing tariffs on ordinary household goods, he says. Redding cautions that tariffs also distort production and consumption, and that their costs can outweigh their benefits when policy is not targeted.

Strategic trade can be justified—but the case is usually narrow
Stephen Redding distinguished between showing that tariffs have costs in a standard economic model and concluding that tariffs can never be justified. The model he described focuses on the decisions of firms and consumers pursuing their own interests. It does not necessarily capture every concern a government might have, including national security or benefits that spill across firms.
He gave four possible arguments for strategic trade policy. The first is that a large country may be able to use a tariff to reduce the price it pays on world markets. If it can do so, the lower price could produce a welfare gain. But Redding stressed a central risk: trading partners may retaliate. A tariff that appears beneficial when considered on its own may lead to further restrictions and change the calculation.
A second argument is shifting profits between firms. Redding used the dispute over European Union support for Airbus as an example. The United States criticized that support as a distortion of trade intended to shift profits in the airline industry away from Boeing and toward Airbus. The instrument in that case was a production subsidy, not a tariff, but the strategic objective was to affect how profits were divided between competitors. That example illustrates a possible rationale for intervention, not a general case for applying tariffs across industries.
A third argument concerns market failures, especially benefits that firms do not capture for themselves. In the standard competitive model Redding described, firms and consumers make decisions with the relevant costs and benefits in view. But learning through production may spill over from one firm to another. If an industry expands, participants may learn to make products more effectively; some of that knowledge may spread across firms without being priced. Redding suggested that this kind of “learning by doing” could support intervention in industries such as semiconductors or electric vehicles. The argument depends on whether such spillovers exist and matter in the industry at issue.
The fourth argument is national security. Private firms may not account for the risk to a country if an important source of supply is disrupted during geopolitical tensions. Redding said that dependence on imports from China could create such a vulnerability. He also opened with the question of whether the United States should be completely dependent on Taiwan for advanced semiconductors, and answered that it probably should not be, given Taiwan’s geopolitically vulnerable position.
The point, he said, is not that every tariff is warranted whenever one of these concerns can be named. Each rationale depends on a particular feature of an industry: the prospect of shifting profits, an unpriced spillover, or a security exposure. He contrasted a possible semiconductor policy with tariffs on bathroom vanities or kitchen sinks, which he said were not obviously matters of national security. The case for intervention is strongest when the policy is tailored to the industry and the concern, rather than generalized to unrelated products.
They tend to be relatively precision guided, to be tailored to a particular industry that you think is important either because of national security, because of these market failures, or because there are some profits to be shifted around in that industry.
Tariffs raise revenue, but they tax production as well as consumption
Asked whether current U.S. tariffs could serve as a way to raise federal revenue instead of imposing a sales tax, Redding began with the point that tariffs do generate revenue. He said the welfare calculation in his lecture included that revenue.
A chart he showed tracked U.S. tariff revenue as a share of total government revenue from 1795 through May 2019. Its on-screen attribution was to Chad P. Bown and Douglas A. Irwin, writing in The Washington Post on July 16, 2019. Redding said tariffs accounted for most federal revenue in the early decades of the Republic, when there were relatively few other taxes. He linked that to limited government capacity: collecting duties at a port, as ships arrived, was comparatively straightforward, while more complex tax systems were harder to administer. He said tariffs can also form a substantial share of revenue in some low-income countries for similar reasons.
That role declined as governments developed other ways to collect revenue, including income and property taxes. The United States has state sales taxes but no federal sales tax, Redding noted; a federal sales tax could be another option if the government chose to adopt one.
The trade-off is not simply between tariffs and no revenue. Tariffs affect the prices facing both producers and consumers, changing decisions on both sides of a market. Redding described their effects as equivalent to a combination of a consumption tax and a production subsidy. A sales tax, in his comparison, changes consumer decisions without the same effect on producers. For that reason, he said, most economists would regard income or sales taxes as less distortionary ways to raise revenue than tariffs.
He also acknowledged a distributional concern with sales taxes: because they apply to consumption, they take a larger share of expenditure from lower-income consumers. That concern does not remove the economic cost of tariffs as a revenue tool. His distinction was that tariffs can raise money, but they do so while altering both consumption and production incentives.
Anti-dumping duties depend on proving intent as well as measuring prices
Redding described anti-dumping policy as another proposed reason for tariffs, while emphasizing how difficult it can be to establish that dumping is happening and to determine the appropriate duty. He gave two definitions: a foreign firm might sell in the U.S. below its marginal cost of production, or it might charge less in the U.S. than in its home market when prices are measured in the same currency.
The concern behind the policy is that low prices could be predatory: a foreign firm might be trying to drive U.S. producers out of the market. But a price difference by itself does not establish that purpose. Redding noted that exchange rates move for reasons unrelated to the prices of particular goods, making currency comparisons difficult. Firms may also charge different markups in different markets for ordinary economic reasons, including differences in the elasticity of demand.
In Redding’s account, a tariff justified as a response to predatory pricing would require policymakers to believe that the foreign firm was deliberately trying to force U.S. competitors out of business. He said the concern could also involve a foreign government subsidizing an industry to drive out competitors in other countries and make them dependent on its supply. He pointed to Matteo Maggiori’s research on geoeconomics as work addressing how governments may use policy to gain dominance in strategic industries. Redding presented that possibility as a connection to the earlier market-failure and national-security arguments, not as proof that any particular low-priced import reflects a deliberate strategy.
The price effect depends on how tariffs pass through the supply chain
A question about Argentina raised whether a long history of protectionism can make an economy less flexible after tariffs are lifted. The questioner described imported goods remaining much more expensive than domestic alternatives after decades of import substitution. Redding contrasted that experience with examples sometimes offered as strategic-trade successes: China’s electric-vehicle and solar-panel industries, and South Korean shipbuilding. He said those cases are presented as instances where government policy helped develop industries that later became competitive in world markets. Argentina and several other Latin American countries, by contrast, were examples he cited of activist trade policies that were less successful at stimulating domestic development and instead left consumers facing higher prices, particularly for imported goods.
On U.S. consumer prices, Redding cautioned against treating the statutory tariff rate as the amount that automatically reaches consumers. He said trade represented around 10% of U.S. expenditure, while the effective tariff in his calculation—duties collected divided by imports—was around 8%. He put some current statutory rates at around 10% to 12.5%, and said the effective rate was lower because of exemptions, tariff-free trade within USMCA, and imperfect enforcement.
Redding offered roughly 0.1 percentage points as an estimate of the overall effect on the consumer price level, using the approximate 8% effective tariff and the fact that imports account for around 10% of U.S. expenditure. He presented this as a rough estimate, not as a precise result that follows directly from multiplying those two figures. He distinguished the one-time effect on the level of prices from a persistent increase in the inflation rate. The estimate is separate from a study he cited.
Redding said that study, by Gita Gopinath and co-authors, found that around one-third of tariffs on consumer goods were passed through to prices paid by consumers. He did not present that fraction as a direct estimate of the overall CPI effect. The amount reaching consumers depends, he said, on distribution chains, domestic markups, and whether importers and retailers can absorb some of the tariff. Those factors also bear on the question of delayed effects or path dependence: the tariff’s effect on a final price depends partly on how costs and markups move through the domestic supply chain.
The WTO’s future could mean renegotiation, a competing system, or institutional decline
Redding described the World Trade Organization as being at a crossroads, and the prospects for its future as uncertain. In his account, the United States had blocked appointments to the WTO appellate body since the Obama administration. He described that body as responsible for adjudicating trade disputes and said it was no longer operational. He said the U.S. concern was the loss of national sovereignty implied by the dispute process.
Redding also said the United States had recently suggested suspending its contributions to the WTO budget. He noted that some recent U.S. tariffs had been justified under domestic legal authorities, including the International Economic Emergency Powers Act, while other countries argued that the tariffs violated U.S. commitments to the WTO. He said that some countries, including China through subsidies, were arguably violating commitments as well. In his description, the dispute-resolution process was not functioning to address these competing claims.
He outlined three possible directions, without presenting any as assured. In the more optimistic scenario, countries would renegotiate the WTO’s terms, address issues such as Chinese subsidies, and reshape the appellate or dispute-resolution process so that the United States could participate. Redding said he personally did not think this outcome was very likely.
A second possibility was a “coalition of the willing”: countries dissatisfied with the existing arrangement could opt out and try to build an alternative system for trade negotiations. Redding said this could involve bilateral negotiations, rather than the multilateral negotiations associated with the existing system.
The third, more pessimistic possibility was that countries would act independently and multilateral trade institutions would unravel. Redding did not assign specific probabilities to the three scenarios. He tied the institutional question back to the economic one: tariffs have effects on welfare, and those effects are distributed unevenly. Assessing the future of trade policy therefore means asking both how tariffs affect an economy and who within it benefits or bears the costs.


