US-Africa Ties Need to Match Each Country’s Economic and Strategic Priorities
Nearly $80 billion in US–sub-Saharan African trade in 2025 has not ensured that US engagement matches the priorities of individual countries, argues Gift Iyioku. In a Hoover Institution analysis of relations with the Democratic Republic of Congo, Nigeria and Djibouti, Iyioku says the problem is not a lack of engagement but a mismatch in its emphasis: US policy should better connect commercial, security and diplomatic ties to each country’s circumstances, and build partnerships that are predictable and mutually beneficial.
Trade volume does not guarantee a well-matched relationship
In 2025, trade in goods and services between the United States and sub-Saharan Africa totaled nearly $80 billion, building on decades of cooperation in health, education, security, diplomacy, development, and investment.
That breadth has not ensured that US engagement reflects the priorities and conditions of individual African countries, says Gift Iyioku. The issue is not simply how much engagement exists, or whether US policy differs from one country to another. It is whether the forms of engagement receiving the most attention fit the circumstances and priorities of each country—and whether they can produce lasting value for both sides.
The Democratic Republic of Congo, Nigeria, and Djibouti illustrate different versions of that mismatch. In each case, the United States is engaged, but the relationship’s most prominent instruments do not fully align with the opportunity or priorities described.
The same imbalance takes different forms
In the Democratic Republic of Congo, longstanding US engagement has included diplomacy, governance, humanitarian assistance, and security. Yet it has not translated into a substantial US commercial presence in critical minerals. That gap matters in light of the Congolese government’s interest in investment in domestic processing, infrastructure, and local industry. The contrast is between a broad record of engagement and a comparatively limited commercial role in an area where the government is seeking investment that could support activity within the country.
Nigeria presents a different problem. US engagement already spans security, trade, technology, education, and development. But high-level attention has often focused on security assistance and governance diplomacy rather than Nigeria’s broader economic and technological potential. The mismatch, then, is not an absence of other kinds of ties; it is the emphasis of high-level attention relative to the range of economic and technological possibilities Iyioku identifies.
In Djibouti, Camp Lemonnier remains central to American security interests in the region, and military cooperation has been a major foundation of the wider relationship. Commercial, educational, and professional ties, by contrast, have remained more limited. The point is not that security cooperation lacks importance, but that a relationship organized heavily around military cooperation leaves other forms of connection less developed.
These cases do not amount to a single prescription for US engagement. Congo’s gap concerns commercial presence alongside stated investment priorities; Nigeria’s concerns the balance between security and governance attention and broader economic and technological potential; Djibouti’s concerns the limited reach of ties beyond military cooperation. Their differences make the general criterion more precise: the mix of diplomatic, security, development, and commercial tools should fit each country’s priorities and conditions, rather than treating engagement itself as evidence that the relationship is well aligned.
Durability depends on fit, not differentiation alone
US policy already varies across African countries, Iyioku says. Differentiation, by itself, does not resolve the problem. A country-specific approach matters only if the forms of engagement receiving attention correspond to that country’s priorities, conditions, and strategic characteristics—and are capable of producing lasting value for both sides.
Iyioku’s stated test for stronger partnerships is therefore practical: they should be predictable, responsive to country-specific priorities, and grounded in mutual benefit. Predictability gives both sides a basis for sustaining the relationship; responsiveness makes the partnership relevant to the country involved; and mutual benefit gives each side an interest in continuing it. The three examples show why those criteria cannot be met by relying on one prominent form of engagement everywhere.