Deterring Iran Requires Economic Pressure, Alliances, and Public Resolve

Barry Strauss distinguishes weakening a regime from removing it. US and allied strikes severely damaged Iran’s political, military, and industrial capabilities, he says, but stopped short of a decisive blow. Military action deliberately limited to avoid wider escalation is unlikely, by itself, to topple an entrenched government.

The record of other wars, Strauss argues, shows how much punishment states can absorb without surrendering. The Confederacy fought on after Atlanta burned; Nazi Germany resisted as Allied forces closed in on Berlin; and North Vietnam regrouped after serious setbacks from US bombing before claiming victory over South Vietnam. The Islamic Republic, too, survived heavy blows. Its eventual fate may depend more on Iranians themselves, supported by continued Western pressure, than on outside force alone.

Strauss says Iran was severely weakened and less able to threaten its neighbors, while the continued US presence in the region serves as a deterrent. But deterrence is not the same as resolution: he identifies verifiable steps, above all relinquishing highly enriched uranium, as central to what must follow.

Barry Strauss invokes Thucydides’ observation that wars defy expectations. Before the conflict, he says, some assumed Iran would hold the Strait of Hormuz in reserve as a final card, and that Israel would be the primary target. Instead, Iran closed the strait early, and the United Arab Emirates became its main target. Strauss describes Iran’s approach as using pressure on Gulf states and control of the strait to gain leverage.

Unexpected choices, he argues, require strategic flexibility and robust contingency planning, rather than confidence in a single account of what an adversary will do. Iran’s closure of the strait disrupted global energy flows. Even an energy-self-sufficient United States, Strauss says, remains embedded in a global economy.

Barry Strauss points to Gulf states, Russia, China, Pakistan, and India as actors whose intelligence, influence on oil markets, mediation, and technology transfers shaped calculations.

China’s role, he argues, illustrates how economic ties can support adversarial networks: it bought most of Iran’s oil and supplied arms. Strauss’s point is that economic relationships and technology transfers belong in the strategic picture alongside direct military action.

The US blockade, he says, crippled Iran’s economy and initially brought it to the negotiating table. Economic warfare can reinforce military action, even as Iran’s own use of the strait imposed costs beyond the region.

The war also exposed limits in US partnerships. Support from NATO and Indo-Pacific partners was limited, with some partners opposing the effort outright. Strauss says the conflict revealed weaknesses in alliance coordination: partners’ willingness to support action cannot be assumed.

Barry Strauss describes the domestic contest over the war as a struggle for hearts and minds. US public support remained divided, as it had during the Vietnam War, while mainstream and social media amplified skepticism. Bold presidential leadership drove the effort, he says, but clearer explanations of the stakes and objectives could have strengthened public resolve.

He contrasts the limited sacrifice in this conflict with the public mobilization of World War II: there were no victory gardens or war songs. Instead, he sees a limited-warfare ethos marked by restraint and aversion to casualties. Strauss says prosperous liberal democracies often exhibit a smaller appetite for war, while dictatorial regimes can be harder.

For Strauss, public understanding is not separate from military strategy. It bears on whether a democracy can sustain the effort its leaders undertake.

Barry Strauss calls the war a wake-up call for shortcomings in munitions stocks, counter-drone capabilities, alliance coordination, and domestic political cohesion. He argues that deterring future aggression requires investment in hard power and alliances, alongside strategic clarity and public understanding.

The strategic problem Strauss describes is broader than whether strikes can damage an adversary. Iran endured punishment, used the Strait of Hormuz to disrupt global energy flows, and remained a threat to its neighbors; meanwhile, allies offered limited support and US public opinion remained divided. In that setting, military strength alone cannot secure the intended outcome. Strauss’s closing standard is realistic objectives, integrated statecraft, resilient partnerships, and the public will to see the effort through.