U.S. Energy Exports Could Strengthen Allies and Advance National Interests

John Deutch frames U.S. energy leadership as a strategic opportunity: resources and technology can serve national interests by helping allies meet their energy needs. The case depends on two linked features of energy markets. Supply positions can change quickly, and import dependence can leave partners exposed not only to unreliable suppliers but also to vulnerable infrastructure.

The U.S. experience illustrates the volatility. The oil import crises of the 1970s brought fuel shortages, long gas lines and economic disruption. Energy security became a national priority because dependence on imports could impose economic costs and create strategic weakness. Government and private-sector efforts to change that position had mixed results.

Deutch credits hydraulic fracturing and horizontal drilling with strengthening U.S. oil and gas production. New nuclear technologies, advanced geothermal energy and carbon capture and storage add to the country’s energy capabilities. He also points to U.S. research and development, and a culture of innovation and risk-taking, as sources of technologies that can disrupt incumbents. But, he cautions, energy technologies and markets can shift rapidly.

The reversal in natural gas makes that point concrete. Deutch says U.S. experts once predicted shortages, and plans were made for more than a dozen gasification plants at LNG receiving terminals to accommodate an expected long-term reliance on imports. About 15 years later, he says, the United States had become the world’s largest LNG exporter, with export capacity expected to grow by half again before 2030.

A U.S. Energy Information Administration chart shown on screen projects that North American LNG export capacity could more than double by 2029. That is a regional projection, distinct from Deutch’s claim about U.S. export capacity. Together, the reversal and the chart illustrate how quickly the assumptions behind energy planning can change.

The strategic value of U.S. energy, in Deutch’s account, lies partly in the contrast between America’s position and the import dependence of its partners.

Europe’s natural-gas import dependence reached 90% in 2018, and its oil import dependence reached 95%, Deutch says. That left Europe vulnerable to Russian energy supply and to the potential destruction of terminals, pipelines and electric grids on which its energy mix depends. The risk, as he describes it, extends from who supplies fuel to the systems needed to deliver it.

Japan’s exposure has a different history. After the 2011 Fukushima disaster, the country shut down many of its nuclear reactors and turned to coal and LNG imports. Deutch says access to LNG from reliable partners is now a key concern in Japan’s economic and security planning. Taiwan faces similar import challenges.

These examples establish why energy partnerships can have strategic as well as commercial value. Deutch argues that U.S. assets and know-how can advance shared economic and strategic goals; India is his most developed example of how that cooperation might produce gains for both sides.

India combines substantial energy demand with limited domestic natural-gas supply. Gas accounts for only a small share of its energy mix, yet India is the world’s fourth-largest LNG importer, Deutch says. As the economy expands and households and industry seek cleaner fuel, he expects LNG imports to rise dramatically. He also sees potential for gas to displace coal in power generation.

For U.S. exporters, that demand could create a market while supporting India’s economy and public health through the use of cleaner-burning natural gas. Deutch says the trade could also improve the U.S. balance of trade. In this form of cooperation, the immediate exchange is fuel: U.S. exports could supply India as its demand grows.

Nuclear cooperation works differently. India’s electricity demand is projected to grow by more than 7% annually, Deutch says. Its nuclear sector has been small, state-owned and long closed to Western nuclear firms. Recent legislative reforms, he says, now permit private investment and U.S. nuclear technologies to enter the market.

Rather than a recurring fuel trade, Deutch describes a possible investment and technology relationship. New nuclear designs could be built in India at lower cost than in the United States. As India develops its nuclear supply chain, it could also contribute to reducing the cost of building U.S. nuclear plants. The proposed benefits therefore run in both directions: U.S. technologies could enter a growing Indian market, while Indian development could help lower construction costs at home.

Deutch’s examples point to distinct ways energy strength can support allies. LNG exports can connect U.S. producers with import demand, as in India’s case; for Japan, he identifies reliable access to LNG as a concern in economic and security planning. Nuclear cooperation, by contrast, involves opening markets to investment and technology and developing supply-chain capabilities over time.

Neither form of cooperation is presented as a fixed advantage. The U.S. shift from anticipated gas imports to major exports is Deutch’s reminder that energy markets and technologies can change rapidly. He argues that U.S. assets and know-how create opportunities for cooperation at a time when American partnerships around the world are in question—and that those opportunities can advance shared goals in a world where the United States and its allies thrive.