Renewed US-Russia Cooperation Depends on Verifiable Mutual Gains

American and Russian astronauts continue to work together aboard the International Space Station, even as the war in Ukraine strains relations between their governments. For Rose Gottemoeller, that partnership shows that cooperation rooted in shared interests can survive political conflict—not that the conflict is insignificant, but that practical work can continue where both sides benefit.

The ISS grew from complementary capabilities: Russian launch vehicles and experience with long-duration spaceflight, alongside American technology and funding. Years of joint operations built professional trust among engineers and crews that, Gottemoeller says, transcended political tensions. She points to similar work on nuclear security, where collaboration helped secure weapons and materials and sharply reduce the danger of nuclear terrorism during the chaotic years after the Soviet collapse.

The lesson is practical rather than sentimental. Projects are more likely to hold when they deliver tangible benefits to both sides, give working-level experts reason to build relationships, and remain focused and verifiable. Predictability and reciprocity can build confidence; their absence invites suspicion.

The cooperative framework took shape amid Russia’s economic and political upheaval. After the Soviet Union broke apart, its economy went into freefall: factories closed, and inflation reached 2,500 percent in 1992, Gottemoeller says. The Soviet nuclear arsenal was also dispersed across four newly independent states—Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Belarus and Russia.

American leaders worked with Russian counterparts on urgent tasks: removing nuclear weapons from the non-Russian states, supporting economic reform through privatization and reopening markets, and starting joint technology projects. Under President Bill Clinton and Russian President Boris Yeltsin, the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission gave this effort an institutional form. Its purpose was to help Russia reform while developing practical partnerships in space and nuclear security.

Summits produced ambitious plans, and Gottemoeller says it once seemed possible to bring Russia into a stable new European order. She places this effort within a broader American belief, held by presidents from George H. W. Bush onward, that close cooperation with Russia mattered to international security and global stability.

Gottemoeller argues that the deterioration was gradual. Russia’s difficult transition fed political chaos and resentment over the loss of superpower status. Vladimir Putin initially appeared open to partnership with the West, she says, but increasingly centralized power, cracked down on independent voices and pursued a vision of Russian greatness incompatible with Western institutions.

Corruption, human rights abuses and anti-democratic practices made genuine partnership harder. In Gottemoeller’s account, domestic politics in Russia became decisive: visible gains could strengthen reformers, while perceived slights could empower hardliners. That tension helps explain why ambitious cooperation did not translate into a durable political alignment.

Gottemoeller also addresses Putin’s stated rationale for invading Ukraine. On February 24, 2022, he asserted that NATO’s eastward expansion and Ukraine’s potential NATO membership posed an existential security threat to Russia. He also claimed that the United States sought to undermine and ultimately destroy Russia by expanding NATO, including through weapons and bases near its borders. Gottemoeller says this account misses the history of American presidents’ efforts to cooperate closely with Russia, which they regarded as important to international security and global stability.

Gottemoeller does not propose a broad restoration of trust while the war continues. She argues that, once Russia concludes the war and joins a fair peace process, the United States should consider cooperation in selected areas.

Space remains a visible example, though Gottemoeller notes that space technology is increasingly moving into the private and commercial sector. She identifies nuclear energy as another possible area, given both countries’ expertise, and points to climate resilience. In the Arctic, thawing permafrost threatens Russian industrial sites and could affect nuclear facilities in both countries. Collaboration in these areas, she says, could bring mutual commercial and security benefits.

These are possibilities, not guarantees of political reconciliation. The standard she draws from earlier cooperation is more demanding: projects should have clear reciprocal value, involve experts who can establish working relationships, and be verifiable. The astronauts still working together in orbit are a reminder of what shared interests can sustain, while the condition she sets for renewed cooperation—an end to the war and a fair peace process—marks the political limits of that example.