Israel’s War Has Made an Unchanged U.S. Aid Relationship Unsustainable

The dispute over U.S. military aid to Israel is no longer confined to the political margins. The House vote on the Massie amendment, in which 103 Democrats voted to end military assistance and another 10 voted present, brought that shift into view. But the panelists disagreed about what the vote meant and what should follow from it.

Ted Deutch called the amendment “performative” rather than serious policymaking. In his account, many members who supported it acknowledged that it was poor policy, but voted that way to accommodate an increasingly absolutist current in Democratic politics—one that, he said, can treat support for Israel’s existence as grounds for exclusion from political or campus spaces.

Deutch argued that a serious policy cannot begin from the premise that Israel alone bears responsibility for resolving the region’s conflicts. Israelis and Palestinians are not going away, he said; Hamas must disarm; Arab states have responsibilities; and the United States has responsibilities. An aid-cutoff vote that its own supporters regard as unworkable, he argued, does not improve the lives of either Palestinians or Israelis.

Dan Shapiro agreed that the House vote was a poor instrument of policymaking, but argued that it reflected a genuine deterioration in Israel’s standing among Americans in both parties, especially younger Democrats and Republicans. He pointed to three years of war, large civilian casualties, and a public perception that Israel asks the United States for ever more support without a sufficiently clear account of the American interest served.

For Shapiro, that deterioration does not make an unchanged relationship sustainable. Two years remain on the U.S.-Israel memorandum of understanding negotiated during the Obama administration, he said, and Israel’s prime minister has indicated that he wants assistance phased out in a future agreement. Shapiro favored managing that transition deliberately: maintaining Israel’s ability to confront threats from Iran and armed groups, while using the leverage of military assistance—or of commercial military sales if aid is phased out—to insist that American equipment be used in accordance with U.S. law and values and in ways that protect civilians.

Dahlia Scheindlin saw the House vote as more than a passing protest. In her view, it points toward a U.S. relationship that is more conditional, less exceptional, and more consistently governed by the rules Washington applies to arms exports elsewhere. She referred to greater attention to the Leahy LawScheindlin cited it as part of the constraints Americans may seek to apply to arms transfers., along with other legal and policy constraints on military assistance.

Scheindlin’s explanation is that Americans are reacting to Israeli policy, not simply to absolutist politics. They see the United States backing a war in Gaza that she said continued too long, despite Israeli public support for a ceasefire tied to hostage releases. They also see Israeli military positions in Lebanon and Syria becoming increasingly durable. Conditionality, in her account, is a response to the belief that U.S. support has enabled these policies.

The differences among the panelists were not reducible to support for or opposition to Israel. They concerned the purpose of aid, the value of leverage, and the likely consequences of ending it quickly.

Shapiro’s central distinction was between changing the relationship and dismantling it. He argued that U.S. assistance is not altruism: Washington provides it because it serves American interests. If that interest is real, he said, the United States should use the relationship to press Israel, Palestinians, and Arab governments toward steps that can produce separation, ultimately two states, and a more integrated regional order.

The panel’s sharpest disagreement was over what has caused American attitudes toward Israel to deteriorate—and what facts a serious public debate must keep in view.

Deutch argued that the debate too often treats Israel as if it acted in a vacuum. Criticism of Benjamin Netanyahu’s conduct of the war is legitimate, he said, but it cannot explain the conflict by itself. Hamas, Palestinian actors, Arab governments, Iran, and the United States all have agency. In particular, Deutch argued that the war’s continuation cannot be discussed without recognizing Hamas’s role.

Deutch said the peace plan under discussion rested on a premise accepted by all parties: Gaza could not continue to be governed by a terrorist organization. He objected to making Netanyahu the sole subject of the U.S.-Israel relationship when Hamas’s disarmament and removal from power remain central Israeli security objectives.

He made a parallel argument about public opinion. Hamas, he said, spent decades using “tens of billions of dollars” to purchase concrete and metal for an underground military fortress rather than protect Gaza’s civilians. The group launched the October 7 attack, was created to destroy Israel, and has publicly said that civilian deaths serve its interests, he said. If audiences encounter only casualty totals and Israeli military operations without that context, Deutch argued, they are being given an incomplete account of the war.

Scheindlin did not deny the existence of influence operations or malign actors online. She said that some early post–October 7 activism was “extremely misguided,” and accepted that bad actors may be involved in some college protests. But she rejected the idea that online manipulation explains a sustained change in representative American public opinion.

Americans are watching mainstream news as well as social media, Scheindlin said. They see tens of thousands of people killed in Gaza, civilian infrastructure destroyed, and towns and cities devastated. Even if they do not follow the forensic debate over how many dead were combatants or noncombatants, many conclude that the United States should not be supporting the campaign they believe it is enabling.

She compared the shift to the way support for wars typically declines over time, including in the United States during Vietnam. Scheindlin said Jewish Israeli opinion also showed this dynamic during what she called the second Iran war: there was broad initial support, but support began to decline after the conflict lasted more than five weeks.

The disagreement is therefore not principally about public relations. Deutch’s concern is that an account of the war without Hamas’s conduct and strategic choices makes Israeli force seem uncaused. Scheindlin’s concern is that Hamas’s conduct and online manipulation do not erase the political effect of prolonged warfare, extensive civilian harm, and the belief that the United States is implicated through its backing of Israel.

That disagreement also shaped their responses to rhetoric about foreign influence. Shapiro said the vice president’s reference to “shadowy” Israeli influence campaigns leaned into antisemitic tropes. Foreign governments are entitled to advocate for their interests, he said, and Americans are entitled to advocate for what they believe serves U.S. interests—whether that means strongly supporting Israel or strongly criticizing it. Neither position should be described as inherently subversive.

Deutch connected this climate to a broader concern about antisemitism. He argued that treating Zionism, support for Israel, or support for AIPAC as evidence that an American is morally suspect can create conditions for hostility and violence against Jews. He referred to the killing in Boulder and to the killings of Sarah Milgrom and Yaron Leshinsky outside an AJC event in Washington. Leaders, he said, should not merely follow young voters’ views; they should help shape a more responsible debate.

Shapiro argued that advocates of a full break in the U.S.-Israel partnership need to explain what comes after it. He did not contend that the current relationship should remain unchanged. His point was that ending military aid—or even ending commercial arms sales—would not simply register American disapproval of Israeli policy. It would alter U.S. power and relationships across the region.

The first consequence, in Shapiro’s assessment, would involve Iran and its regional network. Hezbollah, Hamas, the Houthis, and other Shiite militias are weakened, he said, but not defeated or ideologically transformed. If the United States withdrew from its closest regional partner, they would see an opening to rebuild. Shapiro characterized their aims as anti-American, anti-Israel, and directed toward pushing U.S. influence out of the region while dominating Arab neighbors.

The second consequence would involve U.S. partners, particularly in the Gulf. Shapiro argued that those governments would read a pullback from Israel as evidence that Washington is less reliable. That could weaken efforts to build an integrated defense structure among U.S.-aligned states—an arrangement he said had produced real gains for Israel and Gulf countries during the past three years of war. Partners might hedge toward Iran, he said, and become less inclined to take steps toward normalization and integration with Israel.

The third consequence would concern assistance to Egypt and Jordan. Shapiro argued that if Congress ceased providing military assistance to Israel, it could soon become harder to sustain assistance to Egypt, whose program is tied to the Camp David framework, or to Jordan, which he described as a strategically important partner. Egypt would not stop arming itself, he said; it might buy more weaponry from Russia and China. He similarly worried that U.S. support for Jordan could become politically vulnerable even as Washington seeks to hedge against instability there.

These are forecasts, not points of agreement among the panelists. Scheindlin’s argument for greater conditionality began from a different concern: that U.S. backing has helped sustain policies that damage civilians, weaken neighboring states, and foreclose a political settlement. Shapiro’s answer was that the United States needs enough continuing influence to press for changes in those policies. A total break, in his view, would remove the leverage without solving the conflict.

Whether military support gives Washington useful leverage depends in part on whether Israel’s security posture beyond its borders can produce stability.

Heinrich described Netanyahu’s stated rationale for holding positions outside Israel: create zones in which fighting happens away from Israeli territory. She asked whether Israel could pursue regional stabilization while maintaining military positions in neighboring countries.

Scheindlin’s answer was direct: “the simple answer is no.” In her view, Israel’s prolonged presence in Lebanon and Syria undermines fragile states and can make them more vulnerable to the nonstate armed groups Israel seeks to contain. Stability requires stronger sovereign states capable of resisting militias, she argued, not policies that deepen their weakness.

She compared the approach to Iran’s forward-defense strategy: pushing conflict outward by operating through external arenas and buffers. Iran’s strategy, Scheindlin said, helped weaken sovereign states and empower actors Tehran could not fully control, eventually bringing conflict back to Iran. She did not regard an Israeli version of externalized defense as a viable long-term strategy.

Lebanon illustrates the immediate dilemma. Israel has tied withdrawal to Hezbollah’s disarmament. Scheindlin said negotiations and initial agreements offered some hope of progress, but she saw no credible withdrawal horizon before Israel’s October election. If a Netanyahu government returned, she argued, ideological forces in a future coalition could make a withdrawal plan especially difficult to implement.

She made a similar argument about Syria, where she said Israel still holds positions. Continued control of territory in Syria, in her account, undermines a country already in a fragile condition.

Deutch did not offer a detailed alternative doctrine for Lebanon or Syria. But he disputed the premise that Israeli choices alone explain the conflict. Israel faces armed adversaries beyond its borders with their own capabilities and objectives, he said, and policy should not treat the prime minister as the only actor with agency.

Shapiro’s proposed U.S. role was narrower than a wholesale rejection of Israeli military action. Israel faces legitimate threats from Iran and armed groups and must be able to defend itself, he said. But Washington should use its continuing leverage to reduce actions that deepen conflict, extend military presence indefinitely, and further damage Israel’s standing in the United States and internationally.

The October election in Israel matters because a change in government could change how Israeli leaders respond to their security environment, even if it does not remove that environment.

Shapiro said he could not know whether Netanyahu’s decision to go to war with Iran was driven by electoral calculations. Netanyahu had wanted a war with Iran for a long time, he said, and the conflict was initially popular because Israelis widely see Iran as seeking Israel’s destruction and supporting groups that attack it.

But Shapiro judged the outcome harshly. The war did not lead to the fall of Iran’s regime and, in his view, may have strengthened its strategic position. Israel was also excluded from negotiations over the memorandum of understanding that followed the conflict, which Shapiro called weak and not fully implemented.

His more immediate concern was Netanyahu’s dependence on coalition partners. Shapiro said Netanyahu has sought to retain the support of ministers and parties that favor annexation of the West Bank, expulsion of Palestinians, and what Shapiro described as ethnic cleansing in Gaza. He distinguished those stated preferences from formal government policy and from the conduct of the Israeli military. But he argued that the coalition’s composition affects what Netanyahu accommodates, including his failure, in Shapiro’s view, to crack down effectively on Jewish terrorism against Palestinian civilians in the West Bank.

Shapiro also pointed to Netanyahu’s support for a permanent military-service exemption for ultra-Orthodox coalition partners. That is politically damaging, he argued, because other Israelis—including many who vote for Netanyahu’s own party—serve for extended periods while members of another part of society remain exempt.

An opposition-led government would not return Israel to pre–October 7 assumptions. Shapiro said Israelis remain traumatized and perceive threats on every border, with reason. A different government would likely still support proactive measures against those threats.

But it might be more attentive to Israel’s standing in the United States, with Arab partners, and internationally. Shapiro suggested that an alternative government could reduce settlement expansion, confront Jewish extremist violence, work with rather than seek to collapse the Palestinian Authority, and cooperate with Washington on a Gaza plan. Hamas would still need to be disarmed and removed from power, he said, but a different government might be better positioned to rebuild support for Israel’s legitimate security actions.

Scheindlin likewise tied the election to the future of a political settlement. She did not predict a Netanyahu victory. But she said it remained a plausible scenario, and argued that a returned Netanyahu government could place a negotiated future further out of reach. Scheindlin said the ruling party itself, not only its most extreme coalition partners, has openly supported permanent annexation of Gaza.

The panel’s final disagreement over public diplomacy returned to the question of policy.

Scheindlin said Israel has spent decades trying to improve its image through government ministries, public-diplomacy campaigns, and nongovernmental efforts. More messaging is not the answer, in her view, because the underlying problem is a policy of preventing Palestinian self-determination and a Palestinian state alongside Israel.

Better policy would not persuade people who reject Israel’s existence, she said. But it could marginalize them by denying their arguments a mainstream audience. Public diplomacy can work, she argued, but not while audiences see Israeli policy as fundamentally damaging to Palestinians and to Israel’s own long-term interests.

Scheindlin said the two-state framework negotiated roughly 26 years earlier is no longer viable in its original form. She pointed to settlement expansion, the transfer of West Bank authorities from military to civilian Israeli control, and what she said were policies laying the groundwork for permanent annexation in Gaza.

Her alternative is a confederated two-state arrangement: two states with deeper cooperation and mobility, citizenship separated from residency so that people do not all have to be forcibly uprooted, and a Jerusalem arrangement that does not require dividing the city. It would take a long time, she said, but she viewed it as the only path that avoids a return to recurring violence.

That warning applies even if Israel elects a government less associated with Netanyahu, Scheindlin argued. A more palatable government without a path toward resolution could allow outside observers to relax while the underlying conflict remains unresolved.

Deutch urged a wider view of Israel’s international role. He pointed to engagement in Latin America, opportunities created by the Abraham Accords, ties involving India and the region, and AJC-sponsored agricultural-technology summits connecting Israeli technology with African countries. Those relationships, he argued, show benefits Israel can offer that are not reducible to Gaza policy or the identity of the prime minister.

Shapiro added that regional integration had been advancing before October 7. The Abraham Accords were followed by the Negev Forum, and an expanded summit was planned for October 19 in Marrakesh. Shapiro said additional countries, Palestinians, and Jordan were expected to participate, but the meeting did not occur after October 7.

He argued that this agenda can return through security cooperation, economic ties, health, and development. But that requires the war to end and requires Israeli, Palestinian, and Arab leaders to build an integrated region in which every side has a stake in reducing conflict.