In the 1960s, Soviet cyberneticists envisioned a nationwide computer network to optimize the planned economy, a precursor to the internet. This book explores the ambitious OGAS project and the bureaucratic paranoia and political infighting that ultimately crushed it. Learn about the lost opportunity that could have reshaped the Cold War and the future of technology.
In the sprawling, labyrinthine corridors of Soviet power, an idea was taking shape—an idea so radical, so audacious, that it promised either the ultimate perfection of the socialist state or its complete undoing. It was the dream of a ghost in the machine: a vast, electronic nervous system that would connect every factory, farm, and planning office across eleven time zones. This was not merely about faster calculations or more efficient spreadsheets. It was a vision of a fully rationalized, optimized, and centrally managed economy, a digital reflection of the Soviet Union itself, capable of processing the needs of hundreds of millions of people in real time. The year was 1959. The chill of Stalin’s reign was beginning to thaw under Khrushchev’s leadership, and a spirit of technological optimism, fueled by the triumph of Sputnik, permeated the air. If the USSR could conquer space, surely it could conquer the intractable problems of its own economy. The command economy, for all its ideological purity, was creaking under its own weight. Gosplan, the state planning committee, was drowning in a sea of paper. Information traveled slowly, was often distorted, and arrived too late to be useful. Factory managers hoarded resources and falsified reports to meet arbitrary quotas, creating a system rife with bottlenecks, shortages, and waste. The dream of a perfectly planned economy remained just that—a dream. Into this environment of hope and frustration stepped a new breed of scientist: the cyberneticist. To them, the Soviet economy was not just an economic problem; it was an information problem. They saw the state as a complex system that could be understood, modeled, and ultimately controlled through the principles of feedback and communication. The tool to achieve this was the computer, the whirring, magnetic-taped behemoth that promised to bring order to chaos. Their vision was breathtaking. Imagine a network linking Moscow to Vladivostok, instantly registering the production of every steel mill, the harvest of every collective farm, the inventory of every warehouse. A central computer, a kind of electronic brain, would analyze this torrent of data, identify inefficiencies before they occurred, and recalibrate the entire economic plan on the fly. It was the ultimate expression of central planning, a technological utopia that would leave the chaotic, market-driven economies of the West in the dust. But this ghost in the machine was haunted from the start. To build such a network required not just wires and vacuum tubes, but a radical transparency that the Soviet system was fundamentally designed to prevent. A network that saw everything would expose everything: the lies, the corruption, the incompetence. It would threaten the power of the countless bureaucrats, ministers, and factory directors whose authority depended on controlling information, not sharing it. The dream of a perfectly rational state clashed with the deeply irrational, paranoid, and self-serving nature of its human components. This is the story of that clash—the story of the Soviet Internet that never was, a technological ghost that continues to haunt the history of the 20th century.
The dream of a networked nation did not emerge from the Party apparatus or the halls of Gosplan. It was born in the minds of a small group of brilliant, and perhaps naive, scientists who saw in the nascent field of cybernetics a key to unlocking humanity’s future. They were the Soviet Union’s digital prophets, men who believed that the complex mathematics of information theory could perfect the flawed reality of Marxist-Leninist practice. The foundational figure in this movement was Anatoly Ivanovich Kitov, a Red Army colonel and a pioneering computer scientist. Kitov was not a dissident; he was a true believer. He had served with distinction in World War II and saw his work as a patriotic duty to strengthen the Soviet state. Stationed in the Ministry of Defense, he was one of the first to grasp the revolutionary potential of electronic computers beyond simple ballistics calculations. He saw them as 'thinking machines' capable of managing complex systems, and no system was more complex than the Soviet economy. In the mid-1950s, Kitov began to evangelize for cybernetics, a field that had been briefly branded a 'bourgeois pseudoscience' under Stalin. He argued that the American Norbert Wiener’s theories on communication and control systems were not capitalist ideology but universal scientific principles. For Kitov, cybernetics was the missing ingredient. Marx and Lenin had provided the political and economic blueprint for communism, but cybernetics would provide the technical means to actually build it. It would allow for the scientific management of society, eliminating the guesswork and human error that plagued the planned economy. Kitov was not alone. He was part of a generation of scientists energized by the post-Stalinist thaw. Figures like Aleksei Lyapunov and the philosopher Ernst Kolman championed cybernetics as a tool for progress. They organized seminars, published articles, and fought to give the discipline legitimacy within the rigid Soviet scientific establishment. They were animated by a profound optimism, a belief that science and reason could solve society’s most intractable problems. Their vision was holistic. They didn’t just want to automate a few factories; they wanted to automate the entire flow of information within the state. They imagined a pyramid of computing centers, with local nodes at factories and enterprises feeding data up to regional centers, which in turn would report to a central brain in Moscow. This network would do more than just manage resources; it would create a feedback loop. The central planners would no longer issue blind commands from on high. Instead, they would receive a constant stream of real-time data from the grassroots of the economy, allowing for dynamic, responsive, and truly 'scientific' planning. These cybernetic dreamers saw their work as the logical next step in the communist project. They were building a system to overcome the limitations of the human mind, to process a volume of information no committee could ever hope to manage. In their eyes, they were not just engineers; they were architects of a new, more advanced stage of socialism. But in their focus on logic, data, and efficiency, they overlooked a critical variable: the messy, self-interested, and power-hungry nature of the bureaucracy they sought to optimize.
In January 1959, Anatoly Kitov took a leap of faith that would define the rest of his career and set the stage for the entire saga of the Soviet Internet. He bypassed the entire chain of command and sent a 200-page report, bound in a red cover, directly to the desk of the one man who could make his vision a reality: First Secretary Nikita Khrushchev. This document, later known as the 'Red Book,' was not merely a technical proposal. It was a political manifesto disguised as an engineering plan. Kitov’s proposal was titled 'On the Ways of Development of Automation in the Management of the National Economy.' In it, he laid out the first comprehensive blueprint for a nationwide computer network. He called it the Unified State Network of Computing Centers (EGSVTs). His plan was audacious and elegant. He proposed creating a dual-use network that would serve both the military and the civilian economy. During peacetime, this immense computational power would be dedicated to economic planning, logistics, and resource allocation. In the event of war, it could be instantly repurposed for military command and control. This dual-use argument was a clever strategic move, designed to appeal to the defense establishment’s insatiable appetite for new technology while also addressing the country’s pressing economic needs. He envisioned a network of powerful computing centers scattered across the country, all interconnected and capable of sharing information. He argued that this would eliminate the wasteful duplication of effort where every ministry and factory was trying to build its own isolated, incompatible computer systems. A unified network, he insisted, was the only way to achieve true efficiency and create a holistic view of the national economy. But the most explosive part of the 'Red Book' was not its technical design. It was its proposed governance structure. Kitov, a military man, understood the inertia and corruption of the bureaucracy better than most. He knew that if the network were placed under the control of the existing economic ministries, they would simply use it to protect their own fiefdoms and continue to manipulate data for their own benefit. The system would be rotten before the first vacuum tube was even switched on. His solution was radical: the network should be managed by an independent agency, a new scientific-technical body outside the direct control of the economic planners and the Party apparatchiks. In essence, he was proposing to take control of the nation’s economic information away from the bureaucrats and give it to the scientists. It was a direct assault on the very foundation of the Soviet power structure. The response was swift and brutal. Khrushchev, intrigued but cautious, passed the proposal down to his subordinates for review. The ministries Kitov sought to bypass were now asked to judge his plan. It was like asking turkeys to vote for Christmas. The Central Statistical Administration, the State Planning Committee (Gosplan), and various industrial ministries were horrified. They saw Kitov’s proposal not as a tool for efficiency, but as a dagger aimed at their hearts. It threatened their jobs, their power, and their ability to control the flow of information that was the currency of their influence. A commission was formed, and Kitov was called to defend his ideas. Instead of being hailed as a visionary, he was treated as a heretic. He was accused of 'mechanicism,' of trying to replace the wisdom of the Party with the cold logic of machines. His suggestion of an independent agency was decried as a dangerous attempt to create a parallel power structure. Within a year, Anatoly Kitov was stripped of his position in the Ministry of Defense and expelled from the Communist Party. The 'Red Book' was buried. The messenger had been shot, but the message was out, and another, even more ambitious dreamer was ready to pick up the torch.
Where Anatoly Kitov had been a military man with a pragmatic plan, Viktor Mikhailovich Glushkov was a pure mathematician, a grand theorist with a vision that bordered on science fiction. After Kitov’s political immolation, the mantle of the Soviet network project fell to Glushkov, the charismatic and brilliant director of the Institute of Cybernetics in Kiev. Glushkov learned from Kitov's mistakes. He was a more astute political operator, and he understood that to succeed, he needed to frame his project not as a threat to the Party, but as its ultimate fulfillment. In 1962, Glushkov presented his own, even more elaborate version of the network, which he named the OGAS, or the All-State Automated System for the Gathering and Processing of Information for the Accounting, Planning and Governance of the National Economy. The name itself was a mouthful, a carefully chosen piece of bureaucratic camouflage for a truly revolutionary concept. OGAS was Kitov's EGSVTs on a cosmic scale. Glushkov envisioned a three-tiered hierarchical pyramid. At the base would be tens of thousands of computer terminals in factories, farms, and shops across the USSR, gathering raw data on production, sales, and inventory. This information would flow up to several hundred mid-level computing centers in major cities and economic regions for processing and aggregation. Finally, all data would converge at the pinnacle: a single, massive central computer center in Moscow, giving the top leadership at Gosplan and the Politburo a real-time, god's-eye view of the entire Soviet economy. The scope of OGAS was staggering. It was designed to create a completely paperless economy. All transactions, from the production of a ton of steel to the sale of a loaf of bread, would be recorded electronically. Glushkov even spoke of a future with no physical currency. In his vision, citizens would have electronic accounts, and all payments would be processed through the network. It was a form of digital currency and a social credit system rolled into one, decades before such concepts entered the Western lexicon. This, he argued, would eliminate the black market and give the state perfect visibility into economic activity. More than just an accounting tool, OGAS was intended to be a dynamic modeling system. Using sophisticated mathematical models of the economy, the central computer could run simulations of different five-year plans, identifying potential bottlenecks and optimizing outcomes before a single directive was issued. It would be a crystal ball for central planners. Glushkov famously claimed that without such a system, the Soviet planning apparatus would collapse under the weight of its own complexity by the 1980s, requiring the entire adult population of the USSR just to do the necessary calculations. Glushkov was a masterful salesman for his vision. He produced films, wrote popular articles, and gave captivating lectures, describing a future where cybernetics would free humanity from tedious labor and allow for a more creative, fulfilling existence under communism. He successfully lobbied Premier Alexei Kosygin, a known technocrat, and for a time, it seemed as though OGAS had genuine political momentum. The project was approved in principle, and Glushkov and his institute were tasked with developing the detailed blueprint. For a fleeting moment in the mid-1960s, the dream of the cybernetic state seemed tantalizingly close to reality.
Viktor Glushkov’s grand vision was a masterpiece of technical and mathematical elegance. But in the corridors of Moscow, it was seen as something else entirely: a declaration of war. The OGAS project was not just a plan to install computers; it was a plan to fundamentally rewire the flow of power in the Soviet Union. And the existing powers were not about to give up their territory without a fight. The primary opposition came from the very heart of the system Glushkov sought to reform: the powerful industrial ministries and the central planning bodies. The Soviet bureaucracy was not a monolithic entity. It was a feudal collection of competing fiefdoms, each jealously guarding its own resources, information, and influence. A minister’s power was directly proportional to the size of his budget and the opacity of his operations. OGAS threatened both. A fully transparent, real-time information network would be a disaster for these officials. It would lay bare the widespread practice of 'blat' (influence peddling), the hoarding of resources, and the falsification of production figures used to meet unrealistic quotas. A factory manager who reported meeting his steel quota by producing thicker, heavier sheets than specified would be instantly exposed. A minister who secured a massive budget for a project that was secretly failing would have nowhere to hide. The network would be an incorruptible auditor, and no one wanted to be audited. The Central Statistical Administration (TsSU), led by the powerful and conservative Vladimir Starovsky, became a major adversary. The TsSU’s entire existence was based on its monopoly over economic data. It collected, processed, and curated the information that was presented to the Politburo. Glushkov’s plan to have data flow directly from the factory floor to the network, bypassing the TsSU entirely, was an existential threat. Starovsky and his allies argued that raw, unmediated data would be confusing and dangerous. They insisted on their role as the official gatekeepers of information. Another key opponent was the Minister of Finance, Vasily Garbuzov. He saw OGAS as a direct threat to his ministry’s control over the nation’s purse strings. Glushkov’s talk of a paperless economy and electronic money was particularly alarming. If transactions were managed by a cybernetic network, the Ministry of Finance would be relegated to a bystander. Garbuzov became one of the project’s most vocal critics, relentlessly attacking its projected cost and questioning its feasibility. The arguments used to sabotage OGAS were a masterclass in bureaucratic obstruction. Opponents warned of mass unemployment, claiming that this automated system would make millions of accountants, clerks, and mid-level managers redundant. This was a potent argument in a state that officially guaranteed full employment. They stoked fears of a 'machine dictatorship,' painting a picture of scientists and their algorithms usurping the rightful authority of the Communist Party. They argued that a centralized system was too vulnerable; a single failure could bring down the entire economy. It was far better, they claimed, to let each ministry develop its own, separate computer systems—a strategy that conveniently preserved their autonomy and control.
As if the internal bureaucratic battles weren't enough, the OGAS project was also shadowed by the specter of the Cold War. The very same technological race that had propelled Sputnik into orbit now cast a pall of suspicion over the efforts to build a Soviet information network. In the paranoid atmosphere of the 1960s and 70s, any large-scale technological project was viewed through the distorted lens of the superpower rivalry, and opponents of OGAS skillfully exploited this paranoia. One of the most potent lines of attack was the suggestion that OGAS was somehow connected to, or even inspired by, American military projects. Critics pointed to the development of the ARPANET in the United States, the Pentagon-funded precursor to the internet. The ARPANET was designed as a decentralized network, robust enough to survive a nuclear attack. Glushkov’s OGAS, by contrast, was highly centralized and hierarchical. This fundamental architectural difference became a weapon for his enemies. They whispered in the halls of the Kremlin that Glushkov’s centralized design was dangerously vulnerable. What if American spies or saboteurs could infiltrate the main computer center in Moscow? They could steal state secrets, manipulate economic data, or, in a worst-case scenario, crash the entire Soviet economy with a single stroke. The irony was thick: while American engineers were designing a network to withstand a Soviet nuclear strike, Soviet bureaucrats were arguing that their own network was a security risk because of the Americans. These fears were not entirely baseless. The CIA was indeed actively monitoring Soviet technological developments. But the opponents of OGAS twisted this general threat into a specific indictment of the project itself. They framed it as a potential Trojan horse. Some even went so far as to suggest that the very idea of cybernetics, imported from the West, was a form of ideological subversion designed to undermine the Party’s control. This line of reasoning found a receptive audience among the more conservative, dogmatic elements of the Party and the KGB. They were deeply suspicious of intellectuals and scientists, especially those like Glushkov who traveled to the West and corresponded with foreign colleagues. They were uncomfortable with the idea of a free-flowing information network, even one controlled by the state. Information, in their view, was something to be guarded, compartmentalized, and controlled, not shared across a vast electronic system. The Cold War context also impacted funding. The Soviet economy was perpetually strained by the arms race. Every ruble spent on OGAS was a ruble that couldn't be spent on a new tank, missile, or submarine. The powerful military-industrial complex, while initially intrigued by Kitov’s dual-use proposal, grew wary of Glushkov’s civilian-focused mega-project. Military leaders preferred to fund their own bespoke, secret communication and control networks rather than piggyback on a civilian system that would be managed by a different agency. They became silent allies of the economic ministries, arguing that defense priorities had to come first. The whispers of the Pentagon, amplified by internal rivals, helped ensure that the grand vision of a unified network would be starved of the resources it needed to survive.
In the world of Soviet central planning, every grand project came with a colossal price tag, and OGAS was no exception. Viktor Glushkov and his team, tasked with turning their grand vision into a concrete plan, produced a preliminary cost estimate that would become the project's single greatest vulnerability. The number they arrived at was staggering: 20 billion rubles. To put this figure in perspective, it was more than the Soviet space program and nuclear weapons program combined. It was an astronomical sum that immediately gave opponents their most powerful weapon. Minister of Finance Vasily Garbuzov, OGAS’s staunchest foe, seized on the number. He famously quipped to Premier Kosygin, 'If we start this, we will have to stop everything else.' He framed the project not as a vital investment in the future, but as a fantastical extravagance that the country could not possibly afford. Glushkov fought back, arguing that the 20-billion-ruble figure was for the full, completed system over many years, and that the initial five-year investment would be a more manageable 5 billion. More importantly, he projected that once operational, OGAS would generate over 100 billion rubles in economic efficiency gains within three five-year plans, making it the most profitable investment the state had ever made. He argued that the cost of *not* building OGAS—the continued waste, fraud, and inefficiency—was far greater. But his arguments were based on complex economic modeling and future projections, while Garbuzov’s attack was simple, visceral, and easy to understand: 'It costs too much.' In the risk-averse culture of the Brezhnev-era bureaucracy, a guaranteed immediate cost always loomed larger than a promised future benefit. The debate over cost also masked a deeper ideological struggle. Glushkov’s opponents in the economic reform wing, men like Evsei Liberman, argued for a different path. They believed the solution to the economy’s problems was not more centralization, even of the cybernetic variety, but less. They advocated for introducing market-like mechanisms, giving factory managers more autonomy and allowing them to respond to profit incentives. From their perspective, OGAS was a monstrously expensive attempt to double down on the flawed principle of central planning. They saw it as an effort to build a better cage, when what was really needed was to open the door. This coalition of cost-conscious finance ministers, threatened bureaucrats, and market-oriented reformers proved overwhelming. The Politburo, faced with a choice between a 20-billion-ruble moonshot and the comfortable familiarity of the status quo, blinked. They were unwilling to stake the country’s economic future on such a radical and expensive experiment. Instead of providing the massive, centralized funding Glushkov insisted was necessary, they approved a piecemeal approach. Funds were allocated not to the unified OGAS project, but to individual ministries to develop their own, isolated 'Automated Management Systems' (ASUs). This was a political compromise that was, in effect, a death sentence for OGAS. It allowed the ministries to claim they were modernizing while ensuring that no cross-system transparency would ever be achieved. The USSR would get computers, but it would not get a network. The price of utopia was too high, but the cost of the alternative would prove to be even higher.
The OGAS project did not die in a single, dramatic moment. There was no Politburo meeting where the dream was officially pronounced dead. Instead, it suffered a slow, agonizing decline throughout the 1970s, a classic case of death by a thousand bureaucratic cuts. Viktor Glushkov, a man of boundless energy and optimism, spent a decade fighting a desperate rearguard action, but the forces of inertia and self-interest were too powerful to overcome. The political compromise to fund individual ministry computer systems instead of a unified network was the first, and deepest, cut. It created a technological Tower of Babel. The Ministry of Aviation built systems that couldn't talk to the Ministry of Railroads. The computers used by the steel industry were incompatible with those used by machine tool manufacturers. Each ministry developed its own software, its own data standards, and its own protocols, creating isolated islands of automation. This was precisely the outcome Kitov had warned against in 1959, and it guaranteed that a holistic, real-time view of the economy would remain impossible. Glushkov and his institute in Kiev were officially tasked with providing 'scientific-methodological guidance' to these disparate projects, a hollow mandate with no real authority. He was a general with no army. He watched in frustration as billions of rubles were spent on duplicative, uncoordinated systems that often served only to automate the existing, inefficient paper-based processes. Instead of re-engineering the flow of information, they were simply creating faster paper-pushers. In 1970, Glushkov made one last, desperate push. He presented a revised, detailed technical plan for OGAS to the Politburo. He had the support of Premier Kosygin, but the opposition, led by Finance Minister Garbuzov, was now deeply entrenched. The project was debated, postponed, and sent back to committees for further study—the classic Soviet method for killing an initiative without taking responsibility. The crucial momentum of the 1960s was lost. The era of bold experimentation was giving way to the 'era of stagnation' under Leonid Brezhnev, a period defined by caution, conservatism, and the preservation of the status quo. Glushkov’s health began to fail under the immense strain. He had dedicated his life to the project, traveling tirelessly, giving hundreds of lectures, and fighting endless political battles. He saw the failure to build OGAS not just as a professional disappointment, but as a national tragedy in the making. He correctly predicted that without a radical overhaul of its information management systems, the Soviet command economy was doomed to collapse under its own weight. By the late 1970s, the term OGAS was rarely mentioned in official documents. The grand vision had been whittled down to a collection of uncoordinated local projects. The dream of a national network, an electronic brain for the socialist state, was quietly shelved. Viktor Glushkov died in 1982, just as the economic decay he had foreseen was beginning to accelerate. The project that had been his life’s work died with him, not with a bang, but with the quiet closing of a thousand file drawers in a thousand different ministries.
Viktor Glushkov’s most haunting prophecy came true. In the 1980s, the Soviet Union found itself drowning in an information deficit, a condition that proved to be terminal. The failure to build OGAS was not merely a missed technological opportunity; it was a direct cause of the economic stagnation and eventual collapse of the Soviet state. The command economy, which had been designed for the industrial age of steel and coal, proved utterly incapable of navigating the complexities of the information age. Without a unified network, Gosplan remained blind. The five-year plans, which were supposed to be models of scientific precision, were based on outdated, incomplete, and often deliberately falsified data. The information traveled up the bureaucratic chain on paper, taking months to be compiled. By the time it reached the planners in Moscow, it was a distorted historical artifact, useless for managing a modern economy. The planners were trying to drive a car by looking in the rearview mirror, and even that mirror was cracked. This information deficit created a cascade of absurdities. Factories produced millions of shoes of the wrong size because they were incentivized to meet a simple unit quota, not to respond to consumer demand. Warehouses overflowed with goods that nobody wanted, while shelves in stores remained empty of things people desperately needed. A bumper crop of grain might rot in the fields because the Ministry of Transport had no real-time data on where to send the trucks and trains. Each part of the system operated in its own silo of ignorance, optimized for its own narrow goals at the expense of the whole. The fragmented computer systems purchased by individual ministries only made the problem worse. They created an illusion of modernization while reinforcing the underlying dysfunction. Now, instead of falsifying reports by hand, factory managers could use their new computers to generate even more sophisticated and misleading data to satisfy the ministry. The technology was used not to create transparency, but to deepen the information fog. When Mikhail Gorbachev came to power in 1985 and initiated his policies of 'glasnost' (openness) and 'perestroika' (restructuring), he was essentially trying to solve the very problem that OGAS was designed to address. He understood that the system was failing because of its lack of accurate information and feedback mechanisms. But by then, it was too late. The rot was too deep. Attempting to reform the system without the tools to properly measure or manage it was like performing surgery in the dark. The introduction of partial market mechanisms into a system that still lacked basic information infrastructure only created more chaos. The Soviet Union did not collapse because socialism is inherently unworkable, or because American military spending bankrupted it, though these were contributing factors. It collapsed, in large part, because it was an information-processing system that had failed. It could not see, it could not learn, and it could not adapt. The ghost in the machine that the cybernetic dreamers had tried to build was meant to be the state’s nervous system. By rejecting it, the Soviet bureaucracy had effectively lobotomized the state, leaving it to stumble blindly into the abyss of history.
The story of the Soviet Internet that never was is more than just a curious footnote in the history of the Cold War. It is a profound parable about the relationship between technology, information, and power. Looking back at the ambitious blueprints for OGAS, we are left with a tantalizing and unsettling question: what if it had worked? Imagine a world where the Soviet Union, armed with a fully optimized, cybernetically managed economy, did not collapse in 1991. Would its newfound efficiency have prolonged the Cold War? Or would the very transparency required by the network have inevitably led to a more open and democratic society, as some of its designers secretly hoped? It is one of history’s great counterfactuals. The network designed to perfect central control might have ultimately destroyed it by making the truth of the system’s flaws undeniable to everyone, including its leaders. The failure of OGAS also provides a fascinating contrast to the success of its American contemporary, the ARPANET. Where OGAS was conceived as a rigid, top-down hierarchy, the ARPANET was designed as a decentralized, resilient web with no single point of failure. This architectural difference reflects the profound ideological chasm between the two systems. The internet we have today—chaotic, distributed, and fundamentally uncontrollable—is the direct descendant of the ARPANET’s design philosophy. OGAS represents the alternative path: an internet built not for open communication, but for centralized control. Its ghost echoes in modern debates about state surveillance, social credit systems, and the power of tech platforms to manage and shape society. In the end, the Soviet Union rejected OGAS not because it was technically unfeasible or too expensive, but because it was politically intolerable. The system could not survive the truth. The entrenched bureaucracy chose to protect its own power, even if it meant presiding over a decaying and inefficient empire. They chose to remain blind rather than risk being seen. It is a timeless story: innovation is always a threat to the established order. The dream of the cybernetic state died in the USSR, but the ideas behind it did not. The quest to use vast networks and computational power to model, predict, and manage society is more alive today than ever before. It lives on in the algorithms that shape our financial markets, in the logistics networks that power global commerce, and in the ambitions of governments and corporations to harness big data for social and economic control. The Soviet dreamers failed, but their core belief—that information is the ultimate lever of power—has become the defining reality of the 21st century. The ghost of OGAS is still with us, a silent reminder of a lost future, and a warning about the ones we are currently building.