During the tense Apollo 13 mission, engineers on the ground were faced with an impossible task: build a square carbon dioxide filter in a round hole to save the astronauts. This story details how the Mission Control team, embodying Gilbert's Law under extreme pressure, used only the materials available on the spacecraft to devise a solution. It’s a powerful true story of ingenuity, responsibility, and finding the 'best way' when lives are on the line.
The clock in Mission Control showed one in the morning, but time had ceased to mean anything. Hours earlier, an oxygen tank had torn a hole in the side of the Apollo 13 service module, 200,000 miles from Earth. Three astronauts—Jim Lovell, Jack Swigert, and Fred Haise—were now crowded into the lunar module, a cramped lifeboat never designed to support three men for the four days it would take to get home. The ship itself was dying. Power vanished. Heaters went cold. But the quietest killer was the air itself. With every breath, the men exhaled carbon dioxide, and the needle on the dashboard gauge was climbing. The lunar module, Aquarius, had its own system for scrubbing the poison from the air: small, round lithium hydroxide canisters. But the system was built for two men, for two days. With three men, it was being overwhelmed. The command module, Odyssey, had a surplus of canisters, but they were square. And the canisters were just one problem. The entire environmental system had been designed and built by competing contractors, a universe of incompatible parts. Trying to fit a square canister into a round hole was not a metaphor; it was a lethal engineering problem. In a small conference room back in Houston, a man named Ed Smylie dumped a box onto a table. Smylie was the chief of the crew systems division, a straight-talking engineer with a Southern drawl. He and his team of sixty engineers had been given a task that was brutally simple to state and nearly impossible to solve: Build a new CO2 scrubber. Build it using only the items the astronauts had with them inside the crippled spacecraft. And do it before the air became toxic.
The law of the situation was absolute. There would be no manual, no procedure written in advance for a crisis this specific. It was a perfect, terrible embodiment of what some call Gilbert’s Law: when you take on a job, finding the best way to get the result is your responsibility. No one tells you how. Smylie’s team laid out the inventory of scraps. They had the square canisters from the command module. They had plastic bags used for stowing astronaut belongings. They had the cardboard covers ripped from the spiral-bound flight plan manuals. They had hoses from a pair of spacesuits, and, famously, they had rolls of gray duct tape. The room filled with the tense energy of invention. Ideas were tried and discarded. One engineer suggested running a hose from the command module's system, but the ship was too cold, too dead. They needed a self-contained device. The final design began to emerge, a Frankenstein's monster of engineering. It looked less like NASA hardware and more like a high school science fair project. They took a square canister and enclosed it in a plastic bag to direct the airflow. They used a suit hose to connect it to the lunar module's environmental system. They needed something rigid to keep the bag open and allow air to pass through the canister, so they fashioned a support from the flight plan cardboard. Then they sealed the whole thing with belts of duct tape, wrapped sticky-side out to hold it all together. They called it "the mailbox." As one engineer built it, another wrote down every single step. They couldn’t send up a schematic; every instruction would have to be read aloud, clearly and precisely, to three exhausted men running out of time in the dark. After an hour, the replica was finished. It was ugly, but it worked. The team in Houston had turned a box of junk into a lung. Now, they had to teach the astronauts how to build one just like it, floating in the frozen silence of space.