Lunar Settlements May Need Nuclear Power Where Sunlight Fails
Financial Times science editor Clive Cookson argues that nuclear power could be essential to a permanent lunar settlement because the moon’s most promising resource sites may receive little or no sunlight, and lunar nights can last two Earth weeks. Those same sites would expose reactors to radiation, impacts, extreme heat and abrasive dust, making reliable power a major engineering challenge. Cookson sets the case for nuclear energy against an uncertain commercial prospect: projected revenues for a lunar economy do not establish that a viable market—or a permanent outpost—will follow.
The moon’s geography makes nuclear power a practical constraint
Clive Cookson frames the US-China space race around a basic problem: a lunar settlement needs reliable energy in a place with few stable alternatives. There is no wind for turbines, and one lunar night can last two Earth weeks. At some of the most promising sites, sunlight may never reach the surface. A settlement built there could not treat solar power as a dependable, continuous supply.
Those sites include deep craters near the lunar south pole. They may contain enough water ice to sustain a settlement. Processing that water could also provide oxygen and hydrogen for rocket fuel. The same polar shadows that make sunlight scarce are therefore part of the resource case for going there—and part of the reason a settlement would need a power source that does not depend on it.
The attraction extends beyond ice. Cookson points to rare-earth minerals and the moon’s weak gravity, which could make it easier to send tourists and launch missions farther into the solar system. The comparison shown puts lunar escape velocity at 2.38 kilometres per second, against 11.20 kilometres per second for Earth. Easier access to space is one possible economic advantage of operating from the moon, though it does not by itself establish that lunar activity would be commercially viable.
The commercial case remains a projection, not an established market
Companies including SpaceX are making plans around the prospect of a lunar economy. A PwC Lunar Market Assessment shown in the film projects cumulative revenues of $94bn–$127bn by 2050.
That range is a forecast, not a measure of an existing market. The case for investing in lunar infrastructure depends on the possibility that activity such as resource use, transport or tourism will eventually support it. Cookson identifies potential resources and easier access to space as reasons companies may want to stake a claim, but he does not present the projected revenues as guaranteed.
Nuclear power sits at the centre of that prospect because useful resources may be in places where solar power is least dependable. A reactor could supply energy where sunlight is absent for long periods or does not reach the surface. But the commercial ambition and the engineering problem are distinct: a projected market may give companies a reason to pursue lunar infrastructure, while leaving unanswered how a reactor would be installed, protected, cooled and maintained.
The reactor must survive hazards, heat and abrasive dust
Without a protective atmosphere or magnetic field, lunar reactors would be exposed to meteorite strikes, solar flares and cosmic rays. These are different kinds of exposure, but together they describe an environment in which the plant would have to operate without the protections available on Earth. Cookson presents them as risks to installing and operating the nuclear systems needed to power a lunar economy.
Heat management is another problem. The moon has no air to conduct heat away from equipment, while daytime temperatures can reach 120°C. Engineers would therefore have to find other ways to cool a reactor. The challenge is not simply that the surface gets hot: the absence of air removes a familiar means of transferring heat, so the plant’s cooling approach would need to work in those conditions.
Installation and maintenance would also be complicated by regolith—the ubiquitous lunar dust. Cookson describes it as ultra-fine, ultra-sharp and electrostatically charged, making it sticky and corrosive. That combination could make work around equipment difficult and expose components to damaging material. The source does not specify a particular engineering solution; it emphasizes that both initial installation and later maintenance would have to contend with the dust.
These constraints sharpen the energy trade-off. A settlement in a shadowed region cannot count on continuous sunlight, yet a reactor placed there would need to keep functioning amid radiation, impacts, difficult heat removal and dust. Reliability is the reason nuclear power is attractive, but achieving it on the lunar surface is itself a substantial engineering task.
Robotic surveys are not the same as building a permanent settlement
Getting people to the moon is another constraint. Cookson says NASA’s Artemis programme is over budget and behind schedule, and will not land astronauts on the moon until at least 2028. India and Japan are among the other nations pursuing robotic missions, including efforts to scan polar shadows for water ice.
Those missions address an important part of the resource case: whether ice is present in the places where a settlement might need it. But surveying for water does not solve the separate problems of transporting people and equipment, installing a reactor, or maintaining it in lunar conditions. Establishing that a site may contain useful resources is only one step toward operating a base there.
Cookson’s closing distinction is between reaching the moon and becoming the first to build a permanent, reactor-powered settlement in one of its cold, inhospitable regions. The resource and commercial arguments explain why nations and companies might pursue that goal; the engineering and access constraints explain why a permanent outpost remains a much larger undertaking than a robotic visit.