Britain’s European Defence Role Depends on Spending, Readiness and Alliance Cohesion

The Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF) is a group of northern European countries, including Britain, the Nordic and Baltic states, and the Netherlands. Its members are among the countries most exposed to a political or military crisis involving Russia. The idea, defence correspondent Charles Clover explained, is to make it easier for them to organize a collective response if they cannot count on NATO to organize one.

Clover called the JEF “a hedge against a failure of will by NATO, if push comes to shove.” A military incursion or hybrid attack might not prompt an alliance-wide response on the scale of Article 5, he said. A smaller group of countries that see the threat similarly could organize a collective response more readily.

There is also a British political interest. Since leaving the European Union, the UK has had reason to demonstrate that it remains central to European security, Robert Shrimsley said. The JEF offers Britain a way to build relationships through military cooperation and show that it still matters to European partners. Clover described this as Britain’s “convening power”: the ability to bring strategically important countries together and present itself as a natural leader. The aircraft carrier HMS Prince of Wales, which hosted the conference, was itself part of that display of British power and leadership.

But the grouping’s value depends partly on its limits. Germany has said it does not want to duplicate NATO, despite having a Baltic coastline and an obvious stake in the region. Clover suggested that resistance may also reflect unease about joining a British-led initiative. Adding more countries could make the group less focused and harder to coordinate. Some Baltic voices, Fisher said, are wary of Canada joining because they want the JEF centred on the High North and the Baltic region rather than the North Atlantic.

The tension is between a smaller group that may find it easier to organize a response and a larger alliance whose members may not agree as readily. A sub-group can fill gaps in NATO’s capacity, but concerns about duplication, membership and fragmentation remain. For the JEF, the challenge is to retain enough common purpose to act together while contributing to, rather than duplicating, the wider alliance.

The JEF’s increased importance reflects a broader uncertainty: whether the United States will remain as engaged in European defence as it has been. Fisher noted that the group was founded in 2014, but Britain has found it more useful in the years since Brexit, as pressure has grown for Europe to shoulder more of its own security.

Shrimsley pointed to the sparse American presence at the Atlantic Future Forum, where senior figures from across the Western alliance gathered. A few years earlier, he said, the conference would have included high-level officials from Washington’s national security and defence establishment. Their absence was not proof that the US had left Europe, but it was an indication of how Washington’s priorities are shifting.

He argued that European policymakers should not assume a more traditional, Europe-focused America will return after the current political moment. US voters and politicians, in his account, are questioning the cost of foreign commitments, while seeing China—not Russia—as the country’s main strategic rival. The question heard repeatedly at the conference was what Europe should do if American support is reduced or less immediate.

That uncertainty sharpens European anxiety about US-led talks over Ukraine. Fisher said European allies were concerned that Donald Trump might press Ukraine into a peace deal on terms it could not accept. The talks in Abu Dhabi had ended without an agreement, she noted, though there had been technical progress and discussion of a possible large-scale prisoner exchange if a settlement were reached. Clover added that a possible meeting between Trump, Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping had also been mooted, though he was unsure whether it would happen. In his view, Trump’s approach reflects a world order in which influence belongs to great powers and smaller countries matter less unless they can act as a pole themselves.

For Europe, then, defence cooperation is not only about preparing for a Russian threat. It is also about reducing dependence on a partner whose future choices may be harder to predict.

The threat prompting that preparation is not confined to conventional military attack. Fisher cited arson, interference with subsea infrastructure and cyberattacks as examples of what she described as Moscow’s growing hybrid activity. She also pointed to an attempted drone attack at Leipzig airport as an alarming escalation, while noting that she had not seen anything like it since. Shrimsley’s point was that it is misleading to describe hybrid warfare only as a future possibility: it is happening now.

He compared Russia’s probing of NATO’s response to the raptors testing the electric fence in Jurassic Park: each incident helps Moscow learn where the alliance will stand firm and where it will tolerate further pressure. In his account, NATO’s responses have so far been mild enough to risk emboldening Russia.

Clover emphasized that attribution is part of the problem. Governments need to be able to say that an attack was carried out by Russia, and, he said, they were initially hesitant to do so. He also described the Russian government’s account of the conflict: that NATO supplies technology used by Ukraine to strike Russian rear areas, and that Russia is responding by striking Europe as Ukraine’s economic and manufacturing rear. Clover said there was a symmetry in the logic Russia presents. The practical question, he argued, is how far either side should escalate.

Shrimsley put the military balance in historical perspective. The Russia Europe fears today, he said, has not even succeeded in taking territory it held as part of the Soviet Union. That does not remove the danger, but it complicates the case for treating Russia as an unstoppable conventional force.

The conference also exposed a disagreement about how to respond. Fisher said Lord Mark Sedwill had argued that NATO should think beyond defence and take the initiative against adversaries, especially Russia, by creating strategic dilemmas and increasing the sense of jeopardy for hostile conduct.

Clover contrasted that with comments by Norwegian Vice Admiral Rune Andersen. Andersen had described Russian forces in the High North as under pressure and pulled back towards what he called a bastion around the Kola Peninsula and the Arctic. He said Russia had hardened border posts, placed drone nets around them and used military ships to escort merchant vessels and shadow-fleet tankers. Andersen’s warning, as Clover relayed it, was that NATO had tripled its forces in the High North in three years and should avoid escalation that Russia might misread as a strategic attack.

The distinction is between signalling resolve and creating an avoidable path to miscalculation. The alliance may need to push back against repeated tests, while recognizing that rapid escalation can be misunderstood or answered in kind.

In an interview with Fisher, Defence Secretary Wes Streeting called for more direct communication between Britain and Russia, particularly at a military-to-military level. The British embassy in Moscow already provides an important channel, he said, but additional contact could help manage the risk of miscalculation. Streeting paired that argument with a blunt assessment of Putin’s public position: it was audacious to say Russia did not want war with Europe while, in Streeting’s words, “he’s waging one.”

Clover said communication with an enemy is normal in wartime and should not be confused with negotiation. The purpose is not necessarily to trade concessions, but to clarify what has happened: if something explodes and one side did not cause it, a direct channel can allow it to say so.

Fisher cited an existing hotline between the British and Russian defence ministries, once tested daily by a designated officer but, she understood, not now tested as frequently. She also said the head of Britain’s Secret Intelligence Service, Richard Moore, sometimes speaks with his Russian counterpart. Streeting’s proposal, as Fisher understood it, would go further towards regular, structured dialogue.

Shrimsley cautioned that a hotline is only as useful as the credibility of the person on the other end. If one side does not believe the other’s account of an accident or mistake, communication alone may not prevent escalation.

Clover also described the political obstacle. Russian officials portray Britain as both insignificant and as a central force controlling Ukraine. He cited a March statement by FSB chief Alexander Bortnikov calling Britain the “grand puppet master” of Ukrainian special services. In that climate, he said, Moscow is unlikely to see a UK-Russia channel as an arrangement between equals; the parity Russia seeks is with Washington.

Britain’s ambition to lead European defence runs into a domestic constraint: the money. Shrimsley challenged the idea that weak public support is simply a failure of public understanding. If people are not persuaded, he said, politicians may not have made the case—or may have undermined it by promising more defence spending without delivering it.

He said the British public had shown signs of understanding the risks through its response to preparedness campaigns. The responsibility, in his view, is for governments to explain what more defence requires and what it will cost. That is harder when European economies have limited room to increase spending. Norway has a sovereign wealth fund; Britain is already spending close to its limits, and France faces still greater debt pressures. Shrimsley invoked former NATO secretary-general Jens Stoltenberg, now Norway’s finance minister, who argued that the Cold War was won by economies as much as by militaries: one side could outspend and outlast the other.

Britain’s nuclear deterrent complicates the calculation. Fisher said about 25 per cent of the defence budget goes to the nuclear enterprise.

Clover called that the largest proportion among NATO countries with a nuclear deterrent and said it squeezes conventional forces. At the same time, he argued, Britain receives too little credit for a deterrent that is available to NATO, rather than being solely a national force in the French model. The cost and the alliance contribution are both part of the same trade-off.

The government’s target of spending 3 per cent of GDP on the military by 2030 would require, according to analysts cited by Fisher, an additional £11bn a year. Defence Secretary John Healey has discussed ways to reach it, including a multilateral defence mechanism involving the Netherlands, Poland and Finland and a return to public-private partnerships. Shrimsley said he assumed Healey believed he would deliver, especially given that Healey had resigned over the government’s failure to commit to the target. But he questioned whether the proposed accounting and funding would amount to the full increase in practice.

Shrimsley also objected to measuring defence spending as a share of GDP: governments should determine what the country needs and fund it, he said. Yet the percentage target can still drive spending upwards. The target was now set for 2030, after the next election, and he wondered whether Britain would meet it through “corner cutting and cheeseparing.” Reaching a headline figure, he warned, is not the same as building capability. If Healey fails to deliver the commitment he resigned over, Shrimsley said, the political consequences could be severe.

A limited budget also forces choices about the shape of the armed forces. Fisher raised an argument made in a report by the Prosperity Institute: that Britain, as a maritime country, should concentrate more resources on the Navy rather than spread them across the Army, Navy, Air Force, cyber, space and information capabilities.

Shrimsley saw potential in a “hybrid navy”—ships that are unmanned or mostly unmanned, controlled remotely and supported by a crewed mother ship. Such a model might cost less, just as drones can offer cheaper ways to perform some military tasks. The wider issue, he said, is whether the weapons and systems Britain expects to rely on still make sense in light of the asymmetric fighting seen in Ukraine. Can a military get more capability for the same money by changing what it buys?

Clover described the attraction as “cheap mass.” He pointed to Ukraine’s use of small explosive-laden motorboats against Russian ships in the Black Sea, and suggested that a fleet of inexpensive vessels or floating AI buoys to detect submarines might, in some roles, be more useful than a small number of costly platforms. If many cheap systems are deployed, he said, some can be lost while the force still achieves its purpose.

But the alternative is not proven across every environment. Fisher relayed the objections of former UK defence attaché to Moscow John Foreman, who called hybrid-navy imagery glossy and unproven at sea, with major operational, legal, engineering, digital and logistical challenges. Clover accepted the concern: small craft that work in the Black Sea may not perform in five-metre waves in the North Sea. Britain would still need frigates, he said.

Shrimsley questioned whether a maritime-first strategy would mean accepting a weaker Air Force. Clover’s broader concern was that the Ministry of Defence appears to want everything: armour, drones, carriers, frigates and more, without enough money to provide all of them adequately. A carrier, he noted, requires more than the ship itself. Britain currently lacks enough F-35s to fill HMS Prince of Wales, and a carrier needs a protective group of surface ships, anti-submarine capability and supply vessels to operate safely in war.

The debate therefore is not simply whether old platforms should be replaced by drones or whether Britain should become more maritime-focused. It is whether the country can choose a coherent force structure—and accept the capabilities it will have to give up.

Shrimsley said a prime minister need not make defence the most visible political priority when voters are chiefly concerned about the cost of living. But defence has a way of catching up with governments. Security, resilience and military readiness will shape the coming years, he argued, and a prime minister who remains indifferent to them risks being forced to respond on worse terms.

The closing exchange about emergency supplies made the public-preparedness question concrete. Clover recommended canned food and bottled water; Shrimsley added wind-up radios. Fisher said she had six water barrels in her corridor, where her toddler was using them as an assault course. The detail points to a practical limit on preparedness advice: storing supplies takes space, and not every household has much of it.