Ancient Humans May Have Had Religion, but Its Meaning Remains Unknown
Alex O’Connor argues that people living 150,000 years ago probably had some form of religious or proto-religious experience, but that this does not tell us what they believed. Recurring religious impulses could reflect an evolved human tendency or, as the same evidence might also suggest, the existence of a divinity. O’Connor cautions that personified gods, such as spirits or forces of nature, are not necessarily the same idea as a single, ultimate foundation of reality—and that prehistoric beliefs may not have been literal in either case.

A recurring religious impulse does not identify what people believed
Alex O’Connor says it is highly possible, perhaps probable, that people living 150,000 years ago had some form of religious or proto-religious experience. His starting point is anthropological: human societies appear to develop religious impulses repeatedly, though that pattern is harder to observe in a world where cultures are increasingly connected.
There are two broad explanations for that recurrence. A religious impulse may be an evolutionary tendency, arising independently in different societies; or it may reflect an actual divinity. The same cross-cultural pattern could fit either explanation. O’Connor connects this difficulty to the problem of divine hiddenness: if God exists, why is God not obvious to people? The theologian John Hick’s answer, as O’Connor presents it, is that God may preserve “epistemic distance” so people can act freely, and that the world must in some sense appear as though there were no God. But that proposal, too, leaves the evidence compatible with more than one account.
The data can sometimes be predicted by both.
The key complication is that “religion” can name very different kinds of belief. Imagining spirits in a forest, a god of thunder, or a sun god does not necessarily mean believing in the same kind of being as the singular, ultimate reality described in monotheistic traditions. O’Connor also points to Hinduism: although it is often called polytheistic, Brahman is presented as one foundational reality, with the gods as expressions of it. He compares this with Christianity, where the Trinity is understood as persons of one unified God. In his view, treating all these figures as instances of the same thing blurs an important distinction.
Personified gods and ultimate reality answer different questions
Alex O’Connor distinguishes between gods imagined as characters within the world and God understood as the source or foundation of reality itself. A thunder god who acts, speaks, and interacts with other beings belongs to the created order. That is different from the ultimate reality in which everything exists.
The distinction matters because mystical experience is often described in terms of unity with the divine: the boundary between oneself and God seems to disappear. O’Connor invokes Meister Eckhart’s account of a shared ground between God and the self, and recalls a Sufi mystic who declared, “I am the truth”—a phrase he says uses a name for God in the Quran. These examples, in O’Connor’s account, describe a felt connection to ultimate reality, not simply a relationship with a nature spirit or mythic character.
He says it is difficult to know when the idea of a single foundation of reality began to develop. He points to Aristotle’s account of a first principle as a notably impersonal one: a transcendent actualizing principle that could not concern itself with human affairs. O’Connor gives no date for the emergence of this conception. The distinction leaves open whether people 150,000 years ago personified natural forces, conceived of an ultimate ground of existence, held beliefs that combined the two, or held some other view.
The Greek-god analogy makes room for belief without literalism
Alex O’Connor cautions against assuming that ancient people took their gods literally. He says it is not clear how the Greeks believed in their gods: whether they thought Zeus sat on a mountain throne or Athena literally moved through the world doing things. His analogy is a stuffed animal shared by adults and children. Both may know it is an object while still speaking of it as “him” and treating it as a character. O’Connor suggests that something like this shared practice of personification could help explain how people related to gods.
Chris Williamson offers a modern comparison: people still say an event was “fate” or that fate brought two people together. O’Connor agrees that such language can “slightly animate the universe” without requiring belief in a rule embedded in the universe that dictated the event. He suggests this may help make sense of the Greek gods.
The analogy points to a limit in what can be inferred about prehistoric belief. Personifying a force or using a narrative to describe events does not establish whether people regarded the figure as a literal being, a shared imaginative convention, or something else. Nor does it show whether they had a conception of reality’s ultimate foundation. The discussion makes a religious or proto-religious experience among people 150,000 years ago seem possible, perhaps probable to O’Connor, but it cannot establish which conception—if any—they held.



